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Glossary 
 
α
  = Factor illustrating a manager’s participation rate in rival firm profits 
compared to his participation rate in own firm profits 
iB
 = Payoff for the manager of firm i using relative performance 
evaluation 
CEO = Chief executive officer 
d
 = Total demand if price the price for both products was zero 
e
 = Marginal change in demand if own firm’s sales price is changed by 
one unit 
ε
 = Common shock term  
f
 = Marginal change in demand if the sales price of the competitor is 
changed by one unit 
iF
  = Constant fixed pay for manager of firm i 
iG  = Profit of firm i 
iH
 = Payoff for the manager of firm i using strategic transfer pricing 
iγ   = Portion of payoff based on profit for manager of firm i using an 
incentive scheme based on profit and revenues 
iθ   = Participation rate for the manager of firm i in the sales (quantity) of 
firm i 
i
 = Firm index, { }2,1=i  
j
 = Firm index, { }2,1=j  
k
 = Variable cost for one unit of product 
iM  = Payoff for the manager of firm i using market-share based 
incentives scheme 
iO  = Objective function of the manager of firm i, { }iiii BHGO ,,∈  
ip
 = Sales price of product of firm i 
*
ip
 = Optimal sales price of firm i in equilibrium 
iP   = Constant participation rate for the manager of firm i in his objective 
function iO
 
 V 
iq
 = Quantity produced by firm i 
Q
  = Total quantity produced by all firms in the market 
iR  = Reaction function of the manager of firm i 
RPE = Relative performance evaluation 
is
 = Participation rate for the manager of firm i in the profit of firm i 
2σ
 = Variance 
SEC = Securities exchange commission 
STP = Strategic transfer prices 
it
 = Strategic transfer price for one unit of product for firm i 
iU  = Revenues of firm i (quantity multiplied by price) 
iv
 = Participation rate for the manager of firm i in the profit of firm j 
iw
  = Participation rate for the manager of firm i in the market share of 
firm i 
ix
 = Demand faced by firm i 
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1. Introduction 
 
In the modern corporation ownership is mostly separated from direct control over 
the business. Professional managers deal with day-to-day operations while 
shareholders only rarely get directly involved with major decisions. The well 
known agency problem arises as the owners1 cannot closely monitor the agents 
assigned by them to act on their behalf.2 The managers may act in a way that is 
not in the best interest of the owners. The resulting moral hazard problem consists 
of inducing the agents to supply the proper amount of effort and to take decisions 
consistent with the interests of the principal.3 This conflict of goals under certain 
information asymmetries is often addressed using appropriate incentive systems, 
the most prominent being profit participation.4 By compensating the manager 
partly in proportion to the earned profit his5 objective function is aligned to the 
one of the principal. 
This was however already pointed out by Vickers (1985) that “the separation of 
ownership from control in the large corporation may in some cases be no bad 
thing for the owners. Indeed the separation may be in some cases essential for the 
credibility of some threats, promises and commitments.”6 This is due to the 
strategic effects of certain decisions. Neus and Nippel (1996) define a strategic 
action as having a long-term influence on success by affecting the competitive 
environment. It is therefore a behaviour directed to influence the reaction of the 
competitors. The standard approach to principal-agent problems deals with one 
                                                            
1
 Following Fershtman/Judd (1987) and Miller/Pazgal (2002) I will use the following definitions 
throughout this paper. The owner or principal of a firm is an individual or group whose sole 
purpose is to maximize the profit of the firm. Manager refers to an agent that the owner hires 
to make real time operating decisions. The firm is the organization which is owned by the 
principal and employs the agent. 
2
 The agency problem does obviously not only arise in the relationship between shareholders and 
managers but also through the delegation from top executives to lower management. 
Generally, the literature focuses however on an owner-manager-structure in order to be able to 
safely assume a profit-maximizing objective function on behalf of the principal. I anticipate that 
the classic agency problematic is only marginally touched in this paper as the focus lies on 
strategic firm interaction. To learn more about classic agency-theory I refer to the respective 
literature, e.g. Holmstrom (1982). 
3
 C.f. Holmstrom (1982), p. 324. 
4
 C.f. Dierkes/Hanrath (2002), Pfeiffer (2000) and Rogerson (1997). 
5
 For reasons of readability throughout the paper the principal or owner will be referred to as 
being female while the agent or manager will be referred to as male. The choice is entirely 
discretionary and can freely be inverted by the reader. 
6
 Vickers (1985), p. 143. 
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firm in isolation trying the best possible allocation of risk between a risk neutral 
principal and a risk averse agent. By doing so, strategic effects are ignored as 
monopolistic price-demand-functions are assumed. Most companies do however 
not operate in a monopoly but face more or less rational acting competition.7 
Therefore, unless operating in perfect competition, strategic effects of decisions 
should not be ignored. This paper and the models discussed within it, mainly deal 
with the strategic effects of decisions within a principal-agent framework. 
Therefore any moral hazard problems are mostly ignored to be able to focus 
exclusively on strategic effects. 
As mentioned before the separation of ownership and management can have 
beneficial effects for the shareholders. It was Schelling (1960) who pointed out 
that using a delegate as commitment device can be of advantage to the principal. 
Traditional economic theory of competition assumes that the single aim of firms is 
profit maximization.8 The use of an agent opens the possibility for the principal to 
set a strategic compensation scheme.9 Through such an incentive contract the 
principal can commit to an objective function different from pure profit 
maximization. It is commonly observed in practice that bonus schemes for 
managers are not exclusively profit-based but firms also use sales, relative 
performance against a peer group or other key performance indicators to base 
remuneration on. It may be that the nature of such incentive schemes is largely 
exogenous to the firm, being determined by country-specific norms and rules.10 If 
it is, however, endogenous it becomes a strategic decision for the owners. When 
studying an isolated firm a deviation from profit maximization as objective 
function can only have a negative consequence on profits because of the distortion 
effect. On the contrary however, when the reactions of competitors are included in 
the model one needs to consider also the strategic effect of the incentive 
distortion. This latter effect can indeed be positive and may well outweigh the 
negative distortion effect resulting in an overall increase of profits for the firm.11 
The literature on strategic incentive distortion focuses mainly on two different 
approaches. The first approach is embossed by the works of Vickers (1985), 
                                                            
7
 C.f. Göx (1999), p. 23. 
8
 C.f. Jansen et al. (2007), p. 531. 
9
 C.f. Katz (1991), p. 307. 
10
 C.f. Jansen et al. (2009), p. 142. 
11
 C.f. Neus/Nippel (1996), p. 426. 
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Sklivas (1987) and Fershtman and Judd (1987) and deals with the use of strategic 
transfer prices (STP). The agent’s pay in these models is based not only on profit 
but also on sales, which is virtually the same as changing the cost parameter for 
the manager. The common result is that using such a scheme is always a dominant 
strategy for each player in the duopoly model they study. The second approach 
deals with the use of relative performance evaluation (RPE) in a duopolistic 
setting. This line of study is based mainly on the paper of Aggarwal and Samwick 
(1999). In their model, the agents of both firms are paid not only on the basis of 
their own firm’s profit but the profit of the competitor is also considered in their 
remuneration. They too find that the use of this distortion mechanism is always a 
dominant strategy for both players. 
Both approaches appear to be beneficial for the principals in an oligopoly setting. 
A central role in the literature is however taken by the paper of Dierkes (2004). 
He is the first to bring the two lines of study in the strategic distortion literature 
together and to compare the two approaches in one single model. He 
acknowledges the beneficial effects of both compensation schemes but asks the 
question which one is better. This is an important question because even though 
all these models are specific the underlying idea is of general interest and the 
results are relevant for practical purposes.12 In fact, Dierkes finds that in his model 
relative performance evaluation dominates strategic transfer prices. For each 
player it is always beneficial to choose RPE over STP in any possible situation. If 
this result was directly applicable in practice this would have huge implications 
for the design of incentive contracts. The motivation of this paper is, however, to 
make sure his results are not taken at face value. Even though Dierkes makes an 
important theoretical step it is necessary to critically analyze his model in order to 
avoid premature conclusions: a closer look is needed. 
Dierkes clearly states most of the underlying assumptions of his model. Not 
surprisingly, he fails however to mention how a change in some of the key 
assumptions might affect the results. The goal of this paper is to critically examine 
Dierkes’ model and its result and to provide the reader with a concise discussion 
of the related literature. By discussing models of other authors it is shown that a 
change in some assumptions (some of those to more realistically reflect the real 
                                                            
12
 C.f. Fershtman/Judd (1987), p. 928. 
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world) can decisively affect the model results and parameter implications. The 
model environment is crucial for the resulting outcome. The reader will be 
provided with an overview of what to consider before completely relying on any 
model results or taking steps for practical implication. Additionally, if further 
interest in the subject arises the reader will know what additional literature to 
consult and the assumptions or implications to question. Finally, reviewing all the 
discussed literature it will be deduced that a lot of research questions are still to be 
addressed; theoretical and practical alike. 
 
Following this section the model used by Dierkes is explained in detail. It has a 
central role in joining the two lines of study in this research area and is therefore 
awarded a fundamental position in this work. Afterwards the most relevant 
literature is individually reviewed in section 3 divided into lines of research and 
ordered chronologically. This is not the convention as normally the literature 
leading up to the present research topic is introduced first. This convention is 
intentionally disregarded in this paper for two reasons. First, Dierkes’ publication 
presents a cornerstone of this paper but is somewhat dated. Obviously, research 
has not stopped after the release of his article. A thorough review of related 
literature therefore includes not only papers published chronologically before 
Dierkes’ article but also subsequently. Second, having already given a detailed 
presentation of the model used by Dierkes allows to more clear lay out the 
differences in assumptions and results of model specifications by other authors. 
This allows the reader to get an immediate critical glance at the work of Dierkes 
when related literature is discussed. Section 4 then follows with an exhaustive 
critical discussion of Dierkes’ model based on all the findings of the previously 
discussed literature. The section includes omitted aspects as well as implications, 
empirical findings and an outlook on future research possibilities. Section 5 
concludes and summarizes the findings. The appendices following section 5 
include most proofs and some additional calculations. 
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2. A model of strategic transfer pricing and relative 
performance evaluation 
 
The strategic implications of evaluating managers’ performance considering both 
the own firm and the competitors reaction was recognized by Vickers (1985). He 
notes that “if control of my own decisions is in the hands of an agent whose 
preferences are different from my own, I may nevertheless prefer the results to 
those that would come about if I took my own decisions.”13 He continues that this 
implies that maximum profits on the market are not necessarily earned by firms 
whose managers’ objective is to maximize profits.14 “A manager’s objective 
depends on the structure of the incentives that his owner designs to motivate 
him.”15 The owner can indeed benefit from committing herself to an objective 
function of her manager that is different from her own. Nonetheless, this is only 
possible in a market not characterized by a monopoly or by perfect competition.16 
The reason for this is that the outcome in the oligopolistic market depends, in 
contrast to the monopoly or perfect competition situation, on the objectives of all 
the players and therefore one has to consider strategic interaction. Distorting a 
manager’s incentives can be valuable for the owner if the competitor’s reaction 
has beneficial effects for the own firm.17 There is, however, a trade-off in 
distorting the manager’s incentives. While the “distorting” effect of deviating 
from the final goal is always negative, there is also a strategic effect of influencing 
the competitor’s behaviour. Not only can this latter effect be positive but it can 
also outweigh the previous effect.18 
Such self-commitment to goals different from pure profit maximization can be 
achieved through delegation and incentive schemes. In this sense, “the separation 
of ownership from control in the large corporation may in some cases be no bad 
thing for the owners. Indeed the separation may in some cases be essential for the 
credibility of some threats, promises and commitments.”19 Without delegation, 
                                                            
13
 Vickers (1985), p. 138. 
14
 C.f. Vickers (1985), p. 138. 
15
 Fershtman/Judd (1987), p. 927. 
16
 C.f. Neus/Nippel (1996), pp. 423 ff. 
17
 C.f. Fershtman/Judd (1987), p. 928. 
18
 C.f. Neus/Nippel (1996), p. 426. 
19
 Vickers (1985), pp. 143 f. 
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deviation from profit maximization would otherwise not be realistic for a firm 
were owners were to decide centrally on output and prices.20 
It was first shown by Fershtman and Judd (1987) and Sklivas (1987) that 
rewarding a manager not only based on profit but also on sales (revenues or 
quantities) would alter the competitive outcome. Afterwards, some authors21 
studied how the use of strategic transfer prices could improve a firm’s competitive 
position. It can, however, be shown that both mechanisms are basically 
equivalent.22 In this paper I will focus on strategic transfer pricing, keeping in 
mind that this is equivalent to a participation in profits and sales. 
Later, Aggarwal and Samwick (1999) showed that relative performance 
evaluation was a second mechanism of self-commitment through which it was 
possible to achieve results superior to pure profit orientation. Since then, the 
literature has discussed several aspects of these mechanisms in different 
environments and under different assumptions.23 Dierkes (2004) was, however, 
the first to compare those two mechanisms vis-a-vis each other in a single model 
to find out which one yields better results. This is the reason why his article plays 
a central role in this paper and this section is devoted to explain his model and 
conclusions in detail. 
 
2.1. Dierkes’ model 
Dierkes promotes a specific model to study the strategic delegation subject. 
Nevertheless, the idea behind it is of general interest as the conclusion can have 
various implications for the theory of the firm. Dierkes in his model assumes a 
                                                            
20
 C.f. Göx (1999), pp. 25 f. 
21
 C.f. especially Neus/Nippel (1996), pp. 432 ff., Alles/Datar (1998) and Göx (1999). 
22
 The logic is the same in both cases: through the manipulation of the manager’s incentive 
scheme the owner can credibly convince the competitor of the own increase in production and 
sales through the distortion of marginal cost. C.f. Neus/Nippel (1996), p. 439. The 
mathematical proof is provided in appendix 3. Organizationally there is however a difference. 
While a profit-and-sales contract can be stipulated within the same organizational unit the use 
of transfer prices necessitates at least two divisions in order to charge a transfer price to one 
division for the product provided by the other one. As the implementation method is irrelevant 
for our purposes in this paper and the effects are exactly the same this organizational 
difference will be ignored throughout this work. 
23
 A more detailed overview will be given in section 3. 
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non-cooperative duopoly24 with two rational competitors as is standard in the 
literature on strategic delegation. It is a static model (as both players choose 
simultaneously the prices for one single period) with heterogeneous players 
selling only one type of products. This is to say, the products are differentiated, 
meaning that they are substitutable but not identical.25 Further, it assumes 
symmetric cost and demand functions26 and complete information. Additionally, 
marginal costs are assumed to be constant and there are no capacity restrictions 
allowing for any quantity to be produced.27 Finally, the model assumes 
competition based on prices. This is a crucial assumption as it is well known in 
the literature that results and implications under Bertrand competition are 
normally very different to the results in Cournot models where competition is 
based on output quantities. This will be discussed extensively in section 3. 
The model specifies a game with two profit maximizing players facing the same 
linear price-consumption curve:28 
( ) jijii pfpedppx ⋅+⋅−=,
 
 (1) 
with 
d  Total demand if the price for both products was zero 
e  Marginal change in demand if own sales price is changed by one unit 
f
 Marginal change in demand if the sales price of the competitor is changed 
by one unit 
ip  Sales price of product of firm i 
 
 
                                                            
24
 The cooperative result is therefore excluded. For a discussion of the cooperative result when 
using STP I refer to Göx (1999). 
25
 C.f. Göx (1999), p. 27. 
26
 Because of the Slutsky-Symmetry the demand function is always symmetric when it is derived 
from the utility maximizing consumption plan of a representative household. C.f. Dixit (1986), 
p. 108 and Göx (1999), p. 28. 
27
 These are standard assumptions in duopoly theory. See any standard economics textbook, e.g. 
Varian (1994). 
28
 I will follow the notation of Dierkes throughout this paper, even when discussing models of 
other authors in order to have a better overview. 
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Indexes 
 Firm index, { }2,1=i  
 Firm index, { }2,1=j  
It is assumed that ji ≠ , 0>d  and 0>> fe  and that prices are non-negative. 
These are straightforward assumptions as it seems obvious that prices and total 
demand are positive. Furthermore, a positive e  together with the negative sign in 
front of it makes sure demand for the firm’s product decreases if its price 
increases. This is the normal case and basically excludes Giffen goods.29 The fact 
that f  is also assumed to be positive implies that demand for the firm’s good 
increases if the price for the competitor’s good increases. This implicitly means 
that the two goods of the respective firms are assumed to be substitutes and not 
complements. Also, it is intuitive that the own price has more influence on a 
firm’s demand for its product than has the price of the competitor. This follows 
from the assumption of product differentiation. It recognizes the possibility of 
quality differences and brand identity. Only these non-price factors allow a firm to 
differentiate their product from the competitor’s product and raise prices above 
the perfect competition level. The customer is only willing to pay a higher price if 
the product fits his preferences more closely than the alternative choice.30 Even 
for the theoretical case of prices equal to zero no firm would be able to capture the 
entire demand.31 If that was not to be assumed, price competition would always 
result in the Bertrand-Paradox and hence in marginal cost pricing.32 These are 
standard assumptions in the oligopoly theory. 
Since the only believable goal for the owners is profit, the resulting objective 
function for the principal of firm i  for { }2,1, ∈ji  and ji ≠  is the following: 
 
 
                                                            
29
 Giffen goods are inferior goods for which the income effect dominates the substitution effect. 
Their demand curve therefore slopes upward and an increase in price raises the quantity 
demanded. If such goods exist at all they are very rare and the model does not lose any of its 
applicability by excluding them. C.f. Mankiw (2004), pp. 468f. 
30
 C.f. Alles/Datar (1998), p. 454. 
31
 C.f. Göx (1999), p. 29. 
32
 C.f. Fershtman/Judd (1987), p. 938 and Tirole (2000), pp. 209 ff. 
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( ) ( )jiii ppxkpG ,⋅−=  
 
( ) ( )
ip
jii pfpedkp max→⋅+⋅−⋅−=  (2) 
with 
iG  Profit of firm i  
k  variable unit cost for the product 
The owner wants to maximize her profits and the only decision variable available 
to do so according to her objective function is the price of her own firm’s product 
(since we assume Bertrand competition). However, the owner in this model 
delegates this pricing decision to a manager. The manager then chooses the price 
according to his personal objective function which in turn depends on the 
incentive scheme applied by the owner. The latter commits himself to the pricing 
decision of an agent but in turn gains the freedom to select and design an incentive 
scheme that is different from profit maximization. Again, while no other 
commitment than profit maximization would be believable for the owner of a firm 
this is not true for the incentive mechanism of a manager. Agents are expected to 
maximize their personal payoff. This does not have to be profit but is a result of 
the structure of their negotiated contract which defines the structure of the 
manager’s incentives. In setting up this contract the owner has several degrees of 
freedom. Basically, by committing herself to her agent’s pricing decision the 
principal exchanges one decision variable for another. By doing so she can use the 
additional variable to influence the competitive conditions in her own interest and 
expect to achieve a positive effect on profit from this self-commitment.33 This is 
possible because the manager can be induced to act less competitively. Note that 
the beneficial effect is only due to the effect of committing to a different objective 
function since the principal and the agent are implicitly assumed to have the same 
capabilities.34 Essentially, incentives will be altered in that direction which will 
cause the opposing agents to change their behaviour in beneficial directions.35 
Consequently a result may be achieved that is closer to the result in the case of 
                                                            
33
 C.f. Göx (1999), p. 59. 
34
 C.f. Katz (1991), p. 310. 
35
 C.f. Fershtman/Judd (1987), p. 938. 
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collusive behaviour which is obviously the highest possible36 given the specific 
price-consumption function. I will return to this effect below. 
 
In delegating the pricing decisions to their respective managers both firm’s 
principals have the choice between three different approaches. The first approach 
is to use profit participation. In this scenario the managers objective is the same as 
the principal’s which means that perfect goal alignment is achieved. Hence, the 
decision the manager makes will be equal to the decision the owner would make if 
he was to decide centrally. When both owners choose this approach we get the 
standard Bertrand result and therefore this situation is used as reference solution 
by Dierkes. This case will be discussed in section 2.1. 
The second approach is to choose strategic transfer pricing as delegation 
mechanism. The resulting objective function for the agent of firm i  for { }2,1, ∈ji  
and ji ≠  is: 
( ) ( )
ip
jiiii pfpedtpH max→⋅+⋅−⋅−=  (3) 
with 
iH  Payoff for the manager of firm i  under strategic transfer pricing 
it  Strategic transfer price for one unit of product 
There is no restriction on the strategic transfer price. Consequently, it is allowed 
to be higher or lower than the true unit cost of the firm. 
Finally, the last approach is to choose relative performance evaluation. Under this 
mechanism the manager is paid not only on the basis of his own firm’s profit but 
also considering the profit of the competing firm. The objective function for the 
agent of firm i  for { }2,1, ∈ji  and ji ≠  therefore becomes: 
 
                                                            
36
 While the cartel-solution yields the highest possible profit for both firms, it is not a stable 
equilibrium as each firm owner has a strong incentive to deviate from this solution. It is 
therefore a classic “prisoners’ dilemma” situation. Additionally, such agreements are illegal in 
most of the cases. C.f. Göx (1999), pp. 39 ff. 
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( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )( )
ip
ijjijiiii pfpedkpvpfpedkpsB max→⋅+⋅−⋅−⋅+⋅+⋅−⋅−⋅=  (4) 
with 
iB  Payoff for the manager of firm i  under relative performance evaluation 
is  Participation rate for the manager of firm i  in the profit of firm i  
iv  Participation rate for the manager of firm i  in the profit of firm j  
Note that there are no restrictions on v , allowing it to be positive or negative of 
any magnitude. On the other hand, s  is assumed to be positive even though 
Dierkes does not explicitly explain the reason. This assumption is natural as it 
would very much surprise if a manager received a negative bonus for a positive 
result of his own firm. In fact, if it was negative the manager would be paid to 
work “against” the interests of his principal. Even if any model would result in a 
value of 0<s  being optimal, there is more than just a doubt that any owner or 
shareholder assembly would opt for such a scheme. 
Regarding the value of v , the possibility of a positive effect of the competitors 
profit on the manager’s salary has been criticised in the literature37 for possibly 
being illegal violating anti-trust laws because of its clear collusive effect. 
However, Aggarwal/Samwick (1999) note that this is not the case, stating that 
“there are no legal constraints on firms limiting the amount of relative 
performance evaluation they employ in order to curb aggressive price setting by 
managers.”38 This is also shown by Gilo (1996). Another aspect of critique is that 
a firm has no exact information about its competitor’s profits and sales.39 This 
seems to be unrealistic though as such numbers are regularly published by most 
companies. Also, benchmarking programs and market research can help determine 
an approximation of costs, profits or sales even for most divisions within any 
company.40 Consequently, RPE incentive scheme appears to be a realistic 
approach, even with the possibility of positive participation rate in the 
competitor’s profit. 
                                                            
37
 Among others by Fershtman/Judd (1987), p. 931. 
38
 Aggarwal/Samwick (1999), p. 2008. 
39
 C.f. among others Fershtman/Judd (1987), p. 931. 
40
 C.f. Alles/Datar (1998), p. 453. 
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Note that it is implicitly assumed that each approach involves equal 
implementation costs as they are being ignored in the model. 
Note also that none of the possible objective functions proposed for the managers 
includes any risk premium. It is standard in principal-agent theory to assume the 
principal to be risk neutral. This approach is followed by Dierkes as well. The 
same is not normally true for the agent. However, while this model is based on a 
principal-agent structure, the problem it addresses is quite different. The standard 
literature in this area deals with the agency dilemma treating the difficulties that 
arise under conditions of incomplete and asymmetric information. In Dierkes’ 
model complete information is assumed and the problem addressed is to use 
internal contracts for the distortion of incentives and internal relationships for 
interfirm strategic reasons.41 For reasons of simplicity managers are therefore 
assumed to be risk neutral as well. While this might not be completely realistic, it 
is safe to say that the main conclusions of the model would not alter if incomplete 
and asymmetric information were assumed between the principal and the agent.42 
Note also that the agent will not be rewarded { }iiii BHGO ,,∈  for { }2,1∈i  but a 
linear contract of the form iii OPF + , where iF  is his (constant) fixed pay while 
0>iP  is the (constant) participation rate in his objective function iO  which 
together define the variable part of the payoff. By the property of the assumed risk 
neutrality of the manager he acts to only maximize iO  while the values of the 
constants iF  and iP  are irrelevant.
43
 This results in the objective functions 
specified previously. 
Linear contracts are often used in theory because they are widely spread in 
practice. The reason for this might be that they are simple to understand and easy 
to administer. At the same time linear contracts have the beneficial property of 
causing uniform incentives compared to non-linear contracts which may create 
unintended or unhelpful incentives over the course of a period. 
Furthermore, this linear form of compensation allows to scale the amount the 
agent gets actually paid. Consider the objective function iG  for example. The 
                                                            
41
 C.f. Fershtman/Judd (1987), p. 934. 
42
 Aggarwal/Samwick (1999) show this for the case of relative performance evaluation. 
43
 C.f. Fershtman/Judd (1987), p. 930. 
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agent maximizes according to his principal’s profit function. If however he would 
also get paid the resulting outcome the principal would not receive any benefits. 
By choosing a iP  smaller than one or a negative iF  the principal can make sure 
the agent still acts to maximize iO  while avoiding that he appropriates all the 
benefits. 
Another convenience follows from this assumption. Recall that the owner’s 
objective function was specified to maximize profits defined by profit margin 
multiplied by demand. However, normally one would deduct not only 
(production-)costs but also the managers pay to calculate the final profit for the 
owner. Nevertheless, since the manager maximizes iO  and is risk neutral, the 
owner can set iF  in such a way that iii OPF +  equals the opportunity cost of her 
agent. This implies that the cost of hiring a manager is fixed and unaffected by 
risk, making it equivalent for the principal to maximize profits ignoring the 
managers (total) payoff.44 
These properties are very convenient and make the model much more “user-
friendly”. Assuming this form though is at the same time one of the weaknesses of 
the model. In the principal-agent theory the existence of (linear) incentive 
contracts is motivated by an asymmetric information structure and the following 
moral hazard problem.45 The alternative for the case of complete information as is 
assumed here would then be a forcing contract with no need for linear incentive 
components. However, the assumption of linear contracts is standard in the 
strategic delegation literature as it is consistent with the principal-agent 
framework. Also, this restriction makes most models analytically traceable as 
many of the used techniques would not be applicable if this assumption would be 
dropped.46 Nevertheless, Aggarwal and Samwick (1999) show for their model that 
including risk aversion on the part of the manager as well as disutility and an 
effort choice in the determination of the optimal contract does not affect their 
major conclusions. 
 
                                                            
44
 C.f. Fershtman/Judd (1987), p. 932. 
45
 C.f. Fershtman/Judd (1987), pp. 930 and 939 f. and Aggarwal/Samwick (1999), p. 2007. 
46
 C.f. Jansen et al. (2007), p. 533 
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As both players have three different alternatives we get nine possible situations. 
However, as Dierkes assumes symmetric cost and demand functions those nine 
possibilities reduce to six subgames. They are presented in table 1. 
  Firm 2 
  
Profit 
Participation 
Strategic 
Transfer 
Pricing 
Relative 
Performance 
Evaluation 
Firm 1 
Profit 
Participation 
Subgame I Subgame II Subgame III 
Strategic 
Transfer Pricing 
Subgame II Subgame IV Subgame VI 
Relative 
Performance 
Evaluation 
Subgame III Subgame VI Subgame V 
Table 1: Full game 
Source: Dierkes (2004), p. 49. 
The game consists of two stages. In the first stage the owners of both firms 
simultaneously choose the incentive mechanism.47 Note at this point, that 
renegotiation of the contracts is implicitly excluded by assumption. Subsequently, 
in stage two the managers choose the price of sale for their product given their 
incentive scheme and considering their expectations about the opponent’s price 
choice. In this sense, within each firm the owner acts as a Stackelberg leader48 
with respect to her manager.49 The two stages are essential. Neus and Nippel 
(1996) note that strategic behaviour is only possible if decisions are not taken 
simultaneously or if a plurality of decisions is taken one after the other (the latter 
being the case in Dierkes’ model). The second condition is that after each stage 
the decisions that have been taken are observed by all players (and Dierkes 
                                                            
47
 The choice in fact does not have to be simultaneous. It is however necessary that when 
choosing a mechanism the owners and managers of the firm do not already know the choice 
made by the competitor. Nevertheless, as we assume complete information both competitors 
know the objective function and the possible choices of the opponent and can therefore 
perfectly anticipate the decision of the other player. C.f. Göx (1999), p. 30. 
48
 For the concept of Stackelberg leadership see any standard game theory textbook, e.g. 
Holler/Illing (2006). 
49
 C.f. Alles/Datar (1998), p. 457. 
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follows this assumption as well). The overall timing of the game is shown in 
figure 1. 
 
 
Figure 1: Timing of the game 
To solve multi-stage games one uses backwards induction.50 First, the Nash 
equilibrium at the last stage is identified. Then, using these results as we assume 
complete information, the same procedure is applied to the previous stage until 
stage one is reached. It is necessary to perform this procedure for each subgame. 
Only afterwards, the solution to the full game can be determined. The solution to 
each subgame will be presented throughout the next subsections. 
 
If the decisions could not be observed the competitor could not be influenced by 
it. Consequently, there would only be the negative “distorting” effect without any 
positive strategic effect. Is such a case it would be best to simply do without the 
incentive distorting variable.51 The envelop theorem best demonstrates why this is 
the case. Taking the example of strategic transfer prices the effect of a change in 
the transfer price on firm profit can be decomposed the following way for 
}2,1{, ∈ji  and ji ≠ :52 
i
j
j
i
i
i
i
i
i
i
i
i
t
p
p
H
t
p
p
H
t
H
dt
dH
∂
∂
⋅∂
∂
+∂
∂
⋅∂
∂
+∂
∂
=
**
  (5) 
where *ip  and 
*
jp  are the optimal prices in equilibrium. 
The first summand corresponds to the distortion effect associated with the transfer 
price different from marginal cost and is hence always negative. The second part 
can be ignored as it is zero because due to the first-order condition of the manager 
                                                            
50
 Backward induction is a main mathematical optimization method of dynamic programming. 
See any standard game theory textbook, e.g. Holler/Illing (2006). 
51
 It can however not be excluded that the use of an additional decision variable might be useful 
for reasons other than strategic incentive distortion. C.f. Neus/Nippel (1996), p. 438. 
52
 C.f. Neus/Nippel (1996), p. 435. 
Owners 
choose the 
contracts 
Managers 
observe the 
contracts 
Managers 
choose 
prices 
Firm 
profits are 
realized 
Managers 
receive 
remuneration 
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the transfer price is always set in a position where 0=
∂
∂
i
i
p
H
. Finally, the last 
summand represents the strategic effect. Its sign depends on the model 
specifications. Given our demand function 0>
∂
∂
j
i
p
H
 because an increase in the 
competitors price increases the profit for the own firm. Hence, the expression 
i
j
t
p
∂
∂ *
 
will determine the sign of this last part and it will be positive if the increase in the 
own transfer price induces the competitor to increase the price of its product in 
equilibrium. So only if this strategic effect is positive and outweighs the negative 
distortion effect can it be beneficial for the firm to self-commit to a transfer price 
different from actual marginal cost. 
 
2.2. Solution to subgame I 
This is the situation were both agents are paid a share of their own firms’ profit. 
Consequently, their objective function is equal to the objective function of their 
respective principal. Hence, this is the only one of the six subgames where the 
solution is determined in one single stage. In order to find the Nash equilibrium 
for this stage we first need to differentiate both managers’ objective functions 
with respect to the sales price. The first-order conditions for }2,1{, ∈ji  and ji ≠  
therefore are: 
( ) 02 !=⋅+−⋅⋅−=
∂
∂
ji
i
i pfkped
p
G
 (6) 
If these equations are reformulated to be written as ( )ji pp , the price of the own 
product as a function of the competitor product’s price, the resulting equations are 
known as the agents’ reaction curves and will be denominated by ( )ji pR  for for 
}2,1{, ∈ji  and ji ≠ . They are identified in this manner as they describe the best 
reaction of one agent to his competitor’s price decision.53 It becomes obvious at 
this point that each agent will have to base his decision on his expectations about 
                                                            
53
 As the game in this case is simultaneous nobody is really reacting to a known decision of the 
opponent. Therefore, the notation reaction function is less intuitive for a simultaneous game 
and more appropriate in a Stackelberg setting. C.f. Göx (1999), p. 33. 
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the other manager’s choice. We will see that this will be the case in all subgames 
so that the manager will not be able to make a decision independently from his 
competitor’s decision. Despite this fact, since there is complete information each 
manager can perfectly anticipate the decision the opponent will take.54 The Nash 
equilibrium is the point where both managers’ expectations materialize and none 
can improve his position by altering his pricing decision.55 
Solving the system of two equations given by the first-order conditions in (6) for 
the corresponding prices in the Nash equilibrium can be calculated, being: 
fe
kedpp II
−⋅
⋅+
==
221
 (7) 
As mentioned before, this is the known standard Bertrand-competitive result.56 To 
be better able to compare the results, Dierkes uses simple algebra to present the 
same result in a slightly different form: 
( ) kfe
kfedkpp II >
−⋅
⋅−−
+==
221
 (8) 
It was already mentioned earlier that the model makes the reasonable assumption 
of fe > . Additionally, it is assumed that ( ) 0>⋅−− kfed . The latter assumption 
makes sure that the price is larger than the unit cost. This is also a very realistic 
assumption since otherwise the profit margin would be negative which is not 
economically sensible. The resulting profits for the owners of both firms are given 
by: 
( )( )
( )2
2
21 2 fe
kfedeGG II
−
⋅−−⋅
==  (9) 
 
2.3. Solution to subgame II 
In subgame II the owner of firm 1 still uses profit participation as incentive 
system for its manager, the principal of firm 2 on the other hand uses strategic 
                                                            
54
 C.f. Göx (1999), p. 32. 
55
 A Nash-equilibrium is the point where the strategy of each player maximizes the respective 
expected utility, given that all other players also play their equilibrium strategies. See any 
standard game theory textbook, e.g. Holler/Illing (2006). 
56
 C.f. Varian (1994), pp. 292 ff. 
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transfer pricing. Now we have to solve a subgame with two stages. First, we 
differentiate the agents’ objective functions again with respect to their relevant 
prices. While obviously the first-order condition for the manager of firm 1 
remains unchanged, the one for the manager of firm 2 changes to: 
( ) 02 !122
2
2
=⋅+−⋅⋅−=
∂
∂ pftped
p
H
 (10) 
Solving the system of equations for the prices gives the second stage Nash 
equilibrium at: 
( ) ( )
22
2
1 4
2
fe
tedfkedep II
−⋅
⋅+⋅+⋅+⋅⋅
=  (11) 
( ) ( )
22
2
2 4
2
fe
kedftedep II
−⋅
⋅+⋅+⋅+⋅⋅
=  (12) 
While the manager of firm 1 still decides exactly as his owner would do if 
deciding centrally, the owner of firm 2 has still one variable of influence. Since 
we assume complete information the principal of firm 2 can use his expectations 
about the agents’ reaction curves to optimally choose a strategic transfer price. 
Mathematically this is done by inserting (11) and (12) into her objective function 
and maximizing with respect to the strategic transfer price. The calculus is shown 
in appendix 1. For reasons of comparison the result is, as in subgame I, presented 
in a slightly different but equivalent way by Dierkes: 
( ) ( )( ) kfee
kfedfefkt II >
⋅⋅−⋅
⋅−−⋅+⋅⋅
+= 224
2
2 48
2
 (13) 
It should be noted that the transfer price is higher than the actual unit cost. The 
manager is therefore forced to act as if the costs were higher than they actually 
are. Using this result and inserting it into the result of stage 2 gives the 
equilibrium sales prices for this subgame (results are simplified and rearranged for 
reasons of comparison): 
( ) ( )( ) kfee
kfedffeekp II >
⋅⋅−⋅
⋅−−⋅−⋅⋅+⋅
+= 23
22
1 48
24
 (14) 
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( ) ( )( ) kfe
kfedfekp II >
⋅−⋅
⋅−−⋅+⋅
+= 222 24
2
 (15) 
Hereby it holds that IIII pp 12 > .
57
 So the firm applying strategic transfer prices will 
charge a higher price than its competitor. Finally, inserting these results into the 
owners’ objective function gives us their profit: 
( ) ( )( )
( )222
2222
1
216
24
fee
kfedffeeG II
−⋅⋅⋅
⋅−−⋅−⋅⋅+⋅
=
 (16) 
( ) ( )( )
23
22
2 816
2
fee
kfedfeG II
⋅⋅−⋅
⋅−−⋅+⋅
=  (17) 
Contrary to the prices, the profit of firm 2 using strategic transfer prices is higher 
than for the competitor using profit participation as IIII GG 21 > . The higher transfer 
price induces the manager of firm 2 to charge a higher price. This reduces 
competitive intensity and results in higher profits for both firms.58 
 
2.4. Solution to subgame III 
Subgame III describes the situation where the principal of firm 1 still chooses 
profit participation but firm 2 applies the relative performance evaluation 
incentive scheme. The steps are the same as in subgame II but while for the 
manager of firm 1 the first-order condition remains the same, the first-order 
condition for the agent of firm 2 changes to: 
( )( ) ( ) 0!212212
2
2
=⋅−−⋅⋅−⋅++−⋅=
∂
∂
vpkfspepfdpke
p
B
 (18) 
As before, solve the system of equations to get the Nash equilibrium at the second 
stage: 
( ) ( )
( )22222
2222
1 4
2
vsfse
vkfskesdfskedep III
+⋅−⋅⋅
⋅⋅−⋅⋅+⋅⋅+⋅⋅+⋅⋅
=  (19) 
                                                            
57
 The proof can be found in appendix 2. 
58
 The proofs to all these relations can be found in appendix 2. 
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( ) ( )
( )22222
22222
2 4
2
vsfse
vkevdskesdfskedep III
+⋅−⋅⋅
⋅⋅−⋅+⋅⋅+⋅⋅+⋅⋅+⋅⋅
=  (20) 
Again, the manager of firm 1 makes the same decisions as his principal would 
make. The principal therefore has no remaining decision variable. The owner of 
firm 2 on the other hand still has influence on the design of the incentive scheme, 
equally to subgame II. The difference lies in the decision variable. In Subgame II 
it was the strategic transfer price. Now it is the relation between the participation 
rate in the own firm’s profit and the participation rate in the competitor firm’s 
profit. Consequently, only the principal of firm 2 is considered at stage one. 
Remember that the participation rate in the own firm’s profit is assumed to be 
positive while only v  is allowed to assume any value. Additionally, Aggarwal 
and Samwick (1999) show what effectively determines the incentives are not the 
values of the participation rates but their ratio 
v
s
. Hence, one can be small if the 
other is small as well. In fact, Fumas (1992) and Miller and Pazgal (2002) who 
also discuss the use of relative performance evaluation completely omit a 
parameter for the participation in the profits of the own firm. This is equal to 
setting s  equal to one. Nevertheless, as only the ratio is crucial, this does not 
change the conclusions. Note that also the sign of the ratio is entirely determined 
by the denominator as the numerator is assumed to be positive. The logical 
consequence is that the objective function of the owner is maximized with respect 
to v  and the result written as a relation between the two participation rates. 
Note however an additional peculiarity: stating that the incentives are entirely 
determined by the ratio 
v
s
 does not hold true if a fully specified agency model 
with effort cost and risk aversion were to be assumed. The resulting risk premium 
would cause the absolute level of the parameter s  to become a relevant factor in 
making the decision as it would directly influence the effort level. Nevertheless, 
remember that the objective function is only part of the total compensation of the 
manager. The linear contract consists determining total compensation is actually 
iii OPF +  consisting of a fixed part and the variable part. It has been discussed that 
assuming risk neutrality the agents objective function restricts to simply maximize 
iO . It would therefore be possible to avoid the absolute level of s  to become 
 21 
relevant by sticking to the ratio 
v
s
 in the objective function iO  and modeling the 
effect on risk premium and effort through a change of the parameter iP . 
Nonetheless the problem would not vanish as the new specification would cause 
the whole expression of iii OPF +  to become the agent’s objective function and 
instead of the absolute value of s  becoming decisive the absolute value of iP  
would become part of the decision problem. So in conclusion, when a fully 
specified agency model is assumed the ratio 
v
s
 does not any more completely 
determine incentives but the absolute level of the parameter s  (or iP  depending 
of the model specification) becomes decisive as well. This additional complication 
can be avoided only if risk neutrality by the agent is assumed. The reader should 
keep this in mind in what follows. 
The prices calculated in (19) and (20) are consequently inserted into the owner’s 
objective function which subsequently is maximized for 2v  to get: 
( ) IIIIIIIIIIII ssffee
fef
v 22222 24
2
⋅=⋅
−⋅⋅+⋅
+⋅⋅
= α  (21) 
where IIIs2  is by assumption positive and 
IIIα
 lies between zero and 0.6. The 
participation rate for the competitor’s profit is therefore also positive, meaning 
that the manager’s payoff increases if his competitor’s profit increases. Hereby it 
ensures that the intensity of competition is reduced. As would be expected, the 
participation rate is however lower for the rival firm. This mechanism will be 
discussed in more detail in subgame V in section 2.6. 
As in subgame II only the results are presented here while the intermediate steps 
can be found in appendix 1. Using (21) and inserting it into (19) and (20) gives 
the equilibrium sales prices for this subgame. The resulting prices are identical to 
(14) and (15) calculated in subgame II: 
( ) ( )( ) kfee
kfedffeekpp IIIII >
⋅⋅−⋅
⋅−−⋅−⋅⋅+⋅
+== 23
22
11 48
24
 
( ) ( )( ) kfe
kfedfekpp IIIII >
⋅−⋅
⋅−−⋅+⋅
+== 2222 24
2
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Obviously, as a consequence also the resulting profits for the firms are equal to 
(16) and (17) calculated in subgame II: 
( ) ( )( )
( )222
2222
11
216
24
fee
kfedffeeGG IIIII
−⋅⋅⋅
⋅−−⋅−⋅⋅+⋅
==
 
( ) ( )( )
23
22
22 816
2
fee
kfedfeGG IIIII
⋅⋅−⋅
⋅−−⋅+⋅
==  
The reason why both results are identical is that in both situations firm 2 basically 
has to act as a Stackelberg leader. While prices in stage two are set simultaneously 
by the managers of the two firms, in stage one only the principal of firm 2 has a 
decision to make. Since firm 1 still applies profit maximizing, the decision can be 
delayed and made by the manager in stage two. No other decision variable is 
available at stage one. The owner of firm 2 on the other hand must decide on the 
transfer price or the relation of the participation rates in stage one. Firm 1 only 
follows reacting optimally to the decision made by the principal of firm 2.59 
Therefore, we get the same Stackelberg equilibrium in both subgames. As is well 
known in the literature, a Stackelberg equilibrium in a heterogeneous duopoly 
based on Bertrand-competition is characterized by a second-mover-advantage.60 
This is confirmed here as the profit of firm 1 is higher than the profit of firm 2:61 
IIIIIIIIII GGGG 2211 =>=  (22) 
The opposite is true for their respective prices:62 
IIIIIIIIII pppp 1122 =>=  (23) 
Göx (1999) discusses that what is decisive in this unilateral situation is not the 
sequence of the decisions but the observability of them as will be discussed in 
more detail later. At the same time he notices a conceptual problem: since both 
firms would want to be the follower, in the absence of certain market or sector 
conditions it is unlikely that any firm would voluntarily choose to be the leader. 
                                                            
59
 In this scenario, therefore, the notion reaction curve is more intuitive. 
60
 C.f. among others Göx (1999), pp. 37 f. and pp. 48 ff. 
61
 The proof can be found in appendix 2. 
62
 This proof can also be found in appendix 2. 
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For a closer examination of this these aspects I will return to his paper in more 
detail in the next section. 
 
Subgames II and III have shown that both distortion mechanisms, strategic 
transfer pricing and relative performance evaluation, lead to the same result if the 
competing firm keeps relying on pure profit maximization. It is however worth 
noting, that both approaches operate in a distinct way which can be examined 
when looking at the corresponding reaction functions. It was mentioned earlier 
that the reaction function of each manager is derived when setting the first-order 
condition of his objective function to zero and reformulating the own products 
price as a function of the competing manager’s price. I will derive the reaction 
function for the manager of one firm (firm 263) for all three objective functions. 
Then I will graphically show how the two incentive distortion mechanisms work 
differently compared to the standard Bertrand outcome. 
First, the reaction function of the standard Bertrand equilibrium with profit 
participation can be derived reformulating equation (6). The reaction curve for the 
agent of firm 2 thus is:  
( )
e
kepfdpRB
⋅
⋅+⋅+
=
2
1
12  (24) 
This reaction curve represents the reference case. Using STP the reaction function 
derived from (10) for the manager from of firm 2 becomes: 
( )
e
tepfdpRSTP
⋅
⋅+⋅+
=
2
21
12  (25) 
It is basically the same as before only instead of marginal cost we have the 
corresponding transfer price. Using RPE instead the reaction function of the 
firm’s manager derived from (18) becomes: 
( ) ( ) ( )
2
1212
12 2 se
kpvfkepfdspRRPE
⋅⋅
−⋅⋅+⋅+⋅+⋅
=
 (26) 
                                                            
63
 The choice is only made for illustrative reasons. The results apply symmetrically also to firm 1. 
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Figure 2 shows how the two incentive mechanisms have different effects on the 
original reaction curves. It is apparent from equation (25) that a change in the 
transfer price which replaced marginal cost compared to equation (24) of firm 2 
causes the reaction function to shift parallel. In subgame II we found in equation 
(13) that the optimal transfer price is higher than the actual marginal cost. This 
corresponds to an upwards shift of the reaction curve from ( )12 pRB  to ( )12 pR STP  in 
figure 2.64 Using RPE the parameters 2s  and 2v  are introduced compared to 
equation (24). It has been previously mentioned that maximization takes place 
according to 2v . The result is a relation of this parameter to the size of 2s . 
Therefore, the change in the reaction curve is also discussed with reference to a 
change in the participation rate in the competitor’s profit. An increase in 2v  has 
the effect of increasing65 the slope of the reaction curve.66 Note that ( )12 pRRPE  
intercepts with the original reaction curve ( )12 pRB  where price equals marginal 
cost. The dashed lines in figure 2 describe how the two reaction curves appear 
mathematically. In economic terms however, the agent would not offer his firm’s 
product below marginal cost. Therefore, the actual reaction curve has a minimum 
at this point and is flat until the values of the dependant variable in formulas (24), 
(25) and (26) exceed this minimum. The increase in 2v , therefore, corresponds to 
a rotation of the original reaction curve around the point where price equals 
marginal cost. This can clearly be seen by looking at figure 2. 
Comparing the two mechanisms, we find that the use of strategic transfer prices 
causes a parallel shift of the manager’s reaction function while the use of relative 
performance evaluation results in the change of the slope of the reaction curve. As 
we have seen in subgames II and III, they both shift the equilibrium outwards 
compared to the standard Bertrand result and have thus beneficial effects for the 
firms. The next subsections will show which distortion scheme provides more 
positive when the owners of both firms use strategic incentive distortion. 
 
                                                            
64
 This is a well-known result. See any standard economics textbook, e.g. Varian (1994). 
65
 For firm 1 using RPE the effect would be the other way around and the slope would become 
flatter. Nevertheless, the effect is symmetrical and beneficial in both cases as it moves the 
equilibrium outwards to a new equilibrium with higher prices. 
66
 C.f. Aggarwal/Samwick (1999), pp. 2003 ff. and Polo/Tedeschi (1992), pp. 289 ff. 
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Figure 2: Effects of distortion mechanism on reaction functions 
 
2.5. Solution to subgame IV 
Subgame IV considers the case where both principals choose strategic transfer 
pricing to be the incentive scheme for their agents. Analogous to (10) in subgame 
II for firm 2 the first-order conditions for }2,1{, ∈ji  and ji ≠  therefore are: 
( ) 02 !=⋅+−⋅⋅−=
∂
∂
jii
i
i pftped
p
H
 
Given this homogeneous choice and the assumption of symmetry it is clear that 
the resulting prices from solving this system of equations are also uniform for 
}2,1{, ∈ji  and ji ≠ : 
( ) ( )
224
2
fe
tedftede
p jiIVi
−⋅
⋅++⋅+⋅⋅
=  (27) 
Inserting these into the objective function of the owners and maximizing for the 
respective strategic transfer prices gives the optimal transfer price (obviously also 
symmetric) of subgame IV:67 
( )( )
( ) kffeee
kfedfkt IVi >
−⋅⋅−⋅⋅
⋅−−⋅
+= 22
2
24
 { }2,1∈i  (28) 
                                                            
67
 Again, the result is presented in the same format as does Dierkes and the intermediate steps 
are presented in appendix 1. 
( )12 pRB  
( )12 pRRPE  
( )12 pRSTP  
2p  
1p
 
kp =2
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Both owners charge their manager a transfer price that is higher than the actual 
unit cost (similar to subgame II). The transfer prices therefore make the manager 
act as if their costs were higher than they actually are. This induces the agents to 
increase their sales prices which for reasons of comparison are presented here in 
the shape used by Dierkes:68 
( )( ) kffee
kfedekp IVi >
−⋅⋅−⋅
⋅−−⋅⋅
+= 22 24
2
 { }2,1∈i  (29) 
Applying these prices to the objective function of the owners gives their profits 
for this subgame: 
( ) ( )( )
( ) kffee
kfedfeeG IVi >
−⋅⋅−⋅
⋅−−⋅−⋅⋅⋅
= 222
222
24
22
 { }2,1∈i  (30) 
The use of transfer prices results in a reduction of competitive intensity by making 
the managers act as if their costs are higher than they actually are.69 This can only 
be of interest if it influences the behavior of the competitor.70 The agents are 
implicitly forced to act with a partial collusive strategy.71 As a result, the implied 
profit is closer to the cartel case and higher than in the cases of unilateral 
(subgame II) or bilateral (subgame I) profit participation. Since already the 
unilateral deviation from profit maximization raises profits for both firms, this 
commitment has a cooperative effect.72 If both principals delegate the decision 
using optimal strategic transfer pricing profits can be raised even more (but not as 
far as the joint-profit-maximizing level73). This means that strategic transfer 
pricing in a Bertrand duopoly is a dominant strategy when the alternative is profit 
participation. The same conclusion is drawn by Fershtman and Judd (1987) and 
Sklivas (1987) who were the first to consider this option in a model.74 They note 
however “that the nature of the desired distortion critically depends on the nature 
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 The proof that given the assumptions these prices are higher than those in subgame I is 
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 C.f. Alles/Datar (1998), p. 458. 
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 C.f. Neus/Nippel (1996), pp. 432 f. 
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 C.f. Göx (1999), p. 55. 
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 C.f. Sklivas (1987), p. 457. 
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 C.f. Sklivas (1987), p. 457. 
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using strategic transfer prices. 
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of oligopolistic competition.”75 They find that this positive effect of self-
commitment is only achieved when competition is based on prices. If, on the other 
hand, the model is based on Cournot competition, then the effect is quite the 
opposite. In fact, profits are lower for both firms compared to the profit 
maximizing case, while at the same time STP still remains a dominant strategy. It 
is therefore a classic case of prisoners’ dilemma.76 
Additionally, Alles and Datar (1998) note that improving one’s competitive 
position by using transfer prices above marginal cost is only possible in an 
oligopoly. This is not surprising as considerations of strategic interaction lie at the 
very heart of all these models. Hence, in a monopoly or in perfect competition 
where this crucial element is missing no strategic advantage can be achieved 
through self-commitment. Consequently, “both a monopolist and a perfectly 
competitive firm will choose transfer prices equal to marginal cost.”77 They prove 
this statement also mathematically. 
I will return to these interesting aspects in more detail in the next section. 
 
2.6. Solution to subgame V 
Subgame V deals with the case where both principals’ choose to apply relative 
performance evaluation. The agents’ objective functions are thus analogue to (18) 
in subgame III and for the reasons discussed in subgame IV the first-order 
conditions are again symmetric. For }2,1{, ∈ji  and ji ≠  they are: 
( )( ) ( ) 0!=⋅−−⋅⋅−⋅++−⋅=
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∂
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Solving the system of equations for the prices yields: 
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 Fershtman/Judd (1987), p. 928. See also Sklivas (1987), p. 457. 
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 A prisoner dilemma situation is a game in which the choice of a specific strategy would be 
beneficial to the parties but that outcome is not a Nash-equilibrium because some other 
strategy is dominant even though the resulting equilibrium-outcome is worse for both players. 
See any standard game theory textbook, e.g. Holler/Illing (2006). 
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for }2,1{, ∈ji  and ji ≠ . 
Inserting these into the owners’ objective functions we can maximize and solve 
for the optimal ratio of participation in the rival firm’s profit with respect to the 
own firm’s profit. As always, the result is presented here while the intermediate 
steps can be found in appendix 1: 
VVV
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i ssfe
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= α
2
 { }2,1∈i  (32) 
As in subgame III Vs  is positive by assumption. As Vα  results positive as well the 
same holds true for Vv . The latter one, in contrast to subgame III, now lies 
between zero and one. This implies that in the incentive for the competitor’s profit 
could be as high as to equal the incentive given for the own firm’s profit. Once 
more, this works to reduce competitive intensity. These results hold obviously 
true for both firms in this subgame. 
Given these incentives the managers’ will set the following prices (as always 
presented in the format chosen by Dierkes): 
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This in turn will make sure both firms get a profit of: 
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Similar to the use of strategic transfer prices also relative performance evaluation 
results in a reduction of competitive intensity because each manager also profits 
from the success of the competitor. Consequently, the profit in this case is higher 
than in the cases of unilateral (subgame III) or bilateral (subgame I) profit 
participation78, as it was with strategic transfer prices. Hence, relative 
performance evaluation is a dominant strategy over profit participation in a 
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duopoly based on Bertrand competition. This conclusion was first pointed out by 
Aggarwal and Samwick (1999). The most striking aspect of their result was 
however the positive participation rate in the competitor’s profit because it is the 
opposite of what the principal-agent theory suggests. In principal-agent models, 
the participation rate for the competitor’s profit is always negative so as to filter 
common shocks, thereby reducing the risk for the agent and consequently the 
necessary risk premium to be paid by the principal.79 The result reached here 
shows that while classic benchmarking as proposed by the principal-agent 
literature has a risk-reducing purpose and value, at the same time it has an 
important cost by inducing the manager to compete more aggressively.80 The 
latter effect can be more important in an oligopoly setting where strategic 
interaction is crucial. This might explain why benchmarking in the classic sense is 
so rarely used in practice. I will return to this in more detail in the next section. 
 
2.7. Solution to subgame VI 
We have seen from subgames IV and V that both RPE and STP have basically the 
same effects and benefits over pure profit participation in a Bertrand duopoly. It 
has been mentioned that this was already known in the literature due to the works 
of Fershtman and Judd (1987), Sklivas (1987) and Aggarwal and Samwick 
(1999). However, it was not known which of the two incentive mechanisms was 
better until Dierkes (2004). His main improvement was to compare both strategic 
transfer pricing and relative performance evaluation as incentive systems in the 
same model. This is most obvious when looking first at subgame VI and then at 
the full game. 
Subgame VI describes the situation where one firm’s owner chooses strategic 
transfer pricing while the other one chooses relative performance evaluation. So in 
this subgame there is a direct confront of these two approaches. Assuming firm 1 
applies STP and firm 2 uses RPE, the managers’ objective functions are then 
analogous to (3) and (4) respectively. Differentiating with respect to their own 
sales price yields the first-order conditions of the second stage Nash equilibrium. 
These are obviously the same ones already calculated in equation (10) and (18) 
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 C.f. Holmstrom (1982), p. 339 and Gibbons/Murphy (1990), p. 30. 
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 C.f. Aggarwal/Samwick (1999), p. 2008. For other disadvantages of this benchmarking approach 
see Gibbons/Murphy (1990), pp. 33 ff. 
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from subgames II and III and are represented here again only for illustrative 
reasons: 
( ) 02 !211
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As usual, the system is solved for the resulting prices: 
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These prices are inserted into the objective functions of the owners in stage 1. The 
owner of firm 1 decides on the optimal transfer price while the owner of firm 2 
decides on the optimal ratio of participation rates in own and rival firm profits. 
Differentiating for the respective decision variables and solving for the stage 1 
Nash equilibrium yields:81 
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where VIs2  is positive by assumption and 
IIIα
 lies between zero and 
11
5
. Similar to 
previous results the charged transfer price for the manager of firm 1 is higher than 
the actual unit cost and the manager of firm 2 is positively incentivized by his 
own and the competitor firm’s profit. In stage two of the game they will then set 
the following prices (presented in the usual form): 
( ) ( )( )
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Using these prices the profits of the two firms become: 
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Appendix 2 shows that the price for the product of the firm using relative 
performance evaluation is smaller than the sales price for the product of the firm 
using strategic transfer pricing: 
VIVI pp 12 <  (43) 
The opposite is true, however, for the respective profits:82 
VIVI GG 12 >  (44) 
Thus, subgame VI has shown that when playing strategic transfer pricing in one 
firm against relative performance evaluation in the other firm the latter one 
achieves the better result. 
All six subgames have now been solved and it is therefore possible to analyze the 
results and draw conclusions for the overall game. 
 
2.8. Solution to the full game 
Let us first summarize the conclusions we have already drawn in the subgames. It 
has been shown that under the given assumptions strategic transfer pricing is a 
dominant strategy over profit participation. This had already been proven by the 
works of Fershtman and Judd (1987), Sklivas (1987). Additionally, it has been 
concluded that also relative performance evaluation dominates profit participation 
as strategic incentive mechanism. Any firm is therefore better off if they move 
away from profit participation and apply one of the other two approaches. 
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Playing STP and RPE directly against each other has resulted in higher profit for 
the firm using relative performance evaluation. It remains to be shown that when 
both firms’ principals choose this latter mechanism the resulting profit will be 
higher than when they both choose strategic transfer pricing. This is in fact the 
case83 as can be seen from table 2 which shows the relations between the decision 
variables and profits of the subgames. For a numerical example of the results the 
interested reader is referred to the article of Dierkes as he includes such an 
illustration. 
Decision variables of 
the principals 
10 <<<< VIIIVI ααα ;
 
VIIV
i
II tttk 12 <<<  
Decision variables of 
the agents 
I
i
IIIIIIIIIIIV
i
VIVIV
i ppppppppp >=>=>>>> 112221  
Firm profits 
I
i
IIIIIIIIIIIV
i
VIV
i GGGGGGGG >=>=>>> 22112 ; 
IIVIVI GGG 112 >>  
Table 2: Relations between the firm profits and the decision variables of the 
principals and the agents 
Source: Dierkes (2004), p. 54. 
Using the information given the resulting choice can be intuitively explained the 
following way: for any firm it is best to abandon profit participation as incentive 
scheme since both alternative strategies dominate over it. In choosing one of the 
two alternatives they consider the expected choice of the competitor. If the 
competitor chooses STP, than the better choice would be to choose RPE. If, on the 
other hand, the competitor chooses RPE it is still the better choice to pick the 
same mechanism. Therefore, relative performance evaluation is a dominant 
strategy. Only when both firms’ owners choose this incentive system their 
expectations will be met and none of them has a motivation to abandon this 
strategy for a better alternative. Hence, this situation described by subgame VI is a 
Nash equilibrium in dominant strategies. At the same time it has the convenient 
property of providing both firms with the highest profit achievable in any of the 
subgames. A “prisoners’ dilemma”-situation is consequently avoided in this game 
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making sure both parties end up in the best possible position.84 Given that the 
purpose of Dierkes in his paper was to find out whether STP or RPE is the better 
incentive distortion mechanism, he finds a clear answer. In his model relative 
performance evaluation is always the better choice for each firm and provides 
both with the highest possible profits. 
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 This is obviously only the best possible situation from a firm perspective as from a social 
benefit perspective this is not the case. Since the result is closer to the monopoly outcome the 
two firms benefit while the overall society suffers in economic terms. 
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3. Comparison with related models 
 
In section 2, one specific model from Dierkes (2004) was described and explained 
in detail. In many instances I made references to remarks and conclusions of 
authors and papers that were the fundament of Dierkes’ model. Dierkes adopted 
many of the ideas but could of course not incorporate everything that was 
discussed previously in the literature. In building his model he made a selection of 
what to include in his model and what assumptions to make. Many of these 
choices are implicit and do not result directly from the paper, some can even be 
the basis for critique. 
Additionally, there has been other interesting literature which was not considered 
by Dierkes. Also, research has progressed since his paper was published in 2004. 
While his model has a central role in this paper because it was the first to confront 
strategic transfer pricing and relative performance evaluation in the same model, 
the purpose of this section is to give an overview of the residual most relevant 
literature in this area. Therefore, this section will briefly discuss the conclusions 
of the most fundamental as well as interesting recent literature in the field. To 
avoid confusion, the papers will be dealt one by one, beginning with the literature 
about strategic transfer prices and followed by the one on relative performance 
evaluation. To be consistent, within these two blocks the order will be 
chronological. 
Throughout the section I will also point out the connection of each paper to the 
work of Dierkes. While some indications will also be given, a complete discussion 
of the model of Dierkes in the light of these additional findings will be provided 
in section 4. 
 
3.1. Related literature on strategic transfer pricing 
In this subsection the most important literature concerning strategic delegation 
through the use of transfer prices (or mathematically equivalent mechanisms) will 
be discussed. The focus will be on ground-setting papers as well as literature 
referred to by Dierkes. However, these are complemented by additional literature 
of major significance, published before and after Dierkes’ paper. 
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3.1.1. Vickers (1985) 
In 1985 Vickers was the first to recognize that evaluating a managers performance 
considering not only the own firm but also the reaction of the competitor can have 
important strategic implications. Delegating a decision to an agent with different 
preferences may as a result lead to results that are preferable to the principal over 
the result she would have achieved if taking the decision by herself. 
To prove this Vickers uses an objective function for the agents of the form:85 
ix
iiii xGH max→⋅+= θ
 
},...,2,1{ ni ∈  (45) 
with iG  being the profit, ix  being sales and iθ  being the manager’s participation 
rate in sales of firm i .86 Since Vickers bases his model on an oligopoly with 
Cournot competition, each firm’s profit depends on the output of all the 
competitors in the market. All major other assumptions are equal to those made by 
Dierkes. The owners want to maximize only iG  but strikingly this is achieved by 
providing also positive incentives for sales to the manager. Indeed, iθ  is positive 
for every number of firms in the market larger than one. 
This was a tremendous conclusion given that since the introduction of 
professional managers the separation of control and ownership was considered a 
“necessary bad”. Contrary to this widespread belief, Vickers realizes that “the 
separation of ownership from control in the large corporation may in some cases 
be no bad thing for the owners.”87 In fact, this is the case for every market 
situation that lies between the two extremes of monopoly and perfect competition. 
While for the monopoly case any distortion of incentives is clearly unnecessary, 
Vickers shows in his model that with increasing number of firms iθ  decreases 
approaching zero in the limit. 
Vickers shows that when profit-maximizing principals delegate the production 
decision to the agents, the optimal contract is different from pure profit 
maximization. At the same time, he finds that when all firms in the market switch 
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 Recall that even when discussing models of other authors I have used the notation of Dierkes 
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of the respective authors whenever possible) in order to simplify the overview. 
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 Appendix 3 shows how this objective function is basically equal to the objective function based 
on strategic transfer prices used in section 2. 
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 Vickers (1985), p. 143. 
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to this new optimal type of contract, the output per firm is higher, price is lower 
and, most importantly, profits are lower. So where is the benefit of switching to 
the new incentive scheme? In fact, if none would switch, every firm would be 
better off. However, each firm’s owner individually has an incentive to switch 
because it can improve its situation at the expense of the others. Simultaneously, 
not switching would imply the risk of ending in a worse condition if competitors 
change. Using the new incentive scheme is therefore a dominant strategy in this 
game but with the inconvenient property of ending up in a prisoners’ dilemma 
situation with everyone being worse off than in the original state. 
Vickers finishes off his paper discussing implications of his findings for the 
theory of the firm. Specifically, he identifies four relevant aspects. First, he notes 
that from pursuing profit maximization does not necessarily follow the maximum 
profit. Therefore, the rules of natural selection might cause pure profit maximizers 
to become extinct among managers (not among owners). Second, Vickers already 
points out that based on his findings relative performance evaluation might also 
have a strategic advantage. Third, it is discussed that horizontal mergers in an 
oligopoly are often disadvantageous to the merging parties. The reverse operation, 
splitting the company, can therefore be beneficial, even if it is for the purpose of 
organizing the firm in different divisions. As these divisions have different 
objective functions than the parent the strategic effect on the output of rival firms 
may be positive. Finally, Vickers notes that if vertical integration harmonises 
interests, strategic delegation may provide a good reason for non-integration as a 
divergence of interests can lead to beneficial outcomes. 
 
3.1.2. Sklivas (1987) 
Sklivas picks up Vickers ideas and designs a similar model (considering only two 
players) with the objective function of the manager of firm i  being: 
( )
i
iiiii UGH γγγ max1 →⋅−+⋅=  }2,1{∈i  (46) 
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where iG  is the firm’s profit and iU  is the firm’s revenue. The latter term is 
obviously the product of price and quantity.88 The major improvement of this 
model over the one by Vickers is that Sklivas explicitly considers two different 
environments, once competition based on quantity and the other time competition 
based on price. Afterwards the results are compared. Besides modelling separately 
these two competitive environments all major assumptions are equal to those 
made by Dierkes. 
Regarding quantity competition the findings of Sklivas are conceptually equal to 
the conclusions of Vickers. Under Cournot competition output is higher and 
profits are lower. Contrary to this result, the effects under price competition are 
reversed. Under Bertrand competition prices are higher, quantities lower and 
profits higher. Sklivas concludes that “because firm 1’s unilateral deviation from 
profit maximization raises both firms’ profits, commitment has a cooperative 
effect on the price-competing duopoly: both firms earn higher profits.”89 
Nevertheless, the profits are still lower than the joint-profit-maximizing level. 
This difference in outcome depending on the competitive environment is the most 
striking aspect of Sklivas’ paper. In fact, “if duopolists compete in quantity, both 
firms earn lower profits. Conversely, if duopolists compete in price, both firms 
earn higher profits.”90 
Dierkes bases his model solely on Bertrand competition. Within this framework 
his conclusions are coherent with the findings of Sklivas. While his paper builds 
on the works of both Sklivas and Vickers, Dierkes completely fails to mention the 
different outcomes that might result by framing the model under the assumption 
of Cournot competition. Since the purpose of his paper is to confront strategic 
transfer pricing and relative performance evaluation to see which is better this is a 
point of heavy critique. 
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3.1.3. Fershtman and Judd (1987) 
The paper of Fershtman and Judd was published shortly after the one by Sklivas, 
so it can be assumed that they worked simultaneously and independently on the 
subject. Both use the exact same structure of the model based on profits and 
revenues, which is basically the same as using strategic transfer pricing.91 
Analogous to Sklivas, Fershtman and Judd also play the game based on both, 
Cournot and Bertrand competition and compare the results. Additionally, they 
include uncertainty about crucial market parameters describing demand and costs. 
The major conclusions of the paper are not altered, which is probably why 
Dierkes renounces the use of a random variable. Nevertheless, the inclusion of 
this aspect provides some additional insight into the sensitivity of some variables. 
All the other major assumptions are fundamentally similar to those made by 
Sklivas and Dierkes except that they allow for different costs among the two 
competitors. 
The findings of Fershtman and Judd are basically identical to the ones of Sklivas 
in the way that the “desired distortion critically depends on the nature of 
oligopolistic competition.”92 Under the assumption of quantity competition the 
owner wants to motivate her manager toward high production in order to get the 
competing manager, being aware of these incentives, to reduce his output. Besides 
that they find that assuming random demand the participation rate in profit may 
even be negative. Also, assuming random costs incentive distortion will be higher 
if shocks are common while deviation from profit maximization will be reduced if 
shocks are not common or the variance in costs is too high. On the contrary, in 
price competition the owner wants the managers to set high prices encouraging 
also the competitors to raise prices while keeping sales low. Basically, they find 
the participation rate in sales to be negative93, which translates mathematically 
into a transfer price above costs. 
So far, the conclusions are the same as the ones put forward by Sklivas: “the 
owner of a firm will alter his managers’ incentives in that direction which will 
cause opposing agents to change their behavior in beneficial directions.”94 
                                                            
91
 See proof in appendix 3. 
92
 Fershtman/Judd, p. 928. 
93
 Obviously, a negative participation rate in sales will be very rare if not inexistent in actual 
contracts in practice. 
94
 Fershtman/Judd (1987), p. 939. 
 39 
Fershtman and Judd also observe that incentive distortion is vanishing as the 
number of firms is approaching infinity (thereby translating into perfect 
competition). In this sense they are also coherent with Vickers in finding that the 
strategic use of incentives makes only sense in an oligopoly. Furthermore, they 
make one crucial observation. They realize that the possibility of strategically 
influencing the decisions of the competitor is only possible if the manager’s 
incentives are common knowledge. Therefore, each owner will want to publish 
her manager’s remuneration scheme. This provides another reason for why 
incentive schemes of managers are made public. It might not be solely for 
corporate transparency reasons but the true (or additional) motivation might well 
come from strategic considerations. 
Fershtman and Judd also involuntarily provide critique for the concept of relative 
performance evaluation. This happens when they try to justify why they limit 
themselves only to the own firm’s profit and sales as parameters in the incentive 
contract. First, they argue that a firm has much better information about its own 
profits and sales than about its competitors’. Second, they put forward the 
argument of possible illegality of positive incentives to increase a competitor’s 
profit. However, as was already mentioned in section 2, Gilo (1996) and 
Aggarwal and Samwick (1999) show that this argument does not hold in practice. 
Dierkes ignores this discussion completely. Implicitly we can hereby assume that 
he has no doubts about the availability of competitor information or the legitimacy 
of relative performance contracts. 
Finally the paper points out its major weakness, as seen by Fershtman and Judd. 
There appears to be a conceptual problem as the model is based on linear 
contracts but at the same time through the absence of a detailed asymmetric 
information structure is lacking the basic motive for such contracts. This problem 
is analogously transferrable to Dierkes’ paper and could be an argument of 
rigorous critique of the two articles. Dierkes notes the lack of information 
asymmetry in his paper but does not discuss possible problems or effects of this 
omittance. He refers to the work of Schiller (2000) who identifies several 
problems if information asymmetry is combined with uncertainty. Nevertheless, 
as has already been mentioned in section 2, Aggarwal and Samwick (1999) have 
showed that including information asymmetry does not change the main 
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conclusion of their paper. The same can be safely assumed for the models of 
Fershtman and Judd and Dierkes, making the omittance of information asymmetry 
less problematic. 
 
3.1.4. Neus and Nippel (1996) 
The paper of Neus and Nippel makes some very general points. Vickers and 
Fershtman and Judd derive mathematically that strategic behaviour makes only 
sense in a market not characterized by perfect competition. Neus and Nippel 
develop this discovery further. They state that manipulating the decision variables 
away from profit maximization is bound to have a negative effect on profits when 
used in isolation. If no strategic interaction is taking place the “distortion” effect is 
always negative. In an oligopoly, however, the effects on other players cannot be 
ignored and hence there is also a “strategic” effect. This latter one can be positive 
and might in some situations more than outweigh the negative effect of distortion. 
In the model Neus and Nippel the interest rate for the calculation of the capital 
costs for investments is the decisive variable. This is conceptually the same as 
simply adapting overall costs through the use of transfer prices. The profit 
depends on the decisions of both the own manager and the competitor’s agent and 
competition is solely based on quantity. Most of the major assumptions in the 
model reflect those made by Dierkes. The crucial difference is that Neus and 
Nippel allow for different costs among the two players. Also, they play the game 
in several variants changing the timing of the decision, the availability of the 
decision variable or the observability by the competitor. 
First, they assume both parties make their decisions simultaneously without the 
use of transfer prices. Not surprisingly, they find that the firm with lower costs 
earns a higher profit. Second, they play a Stackelberg game where one firm’s 
agent has to choose first; still without the use of transfer prices. By the time the 
second firm’s manager has to make a decision he therefore already knows the 
choice made by his competitor. Nevertheless, the agent of firm 1 can anticipate 
the reaction of the manager of firm 2 and use this knowledge for his own firm’s 
benefit. Consequently, firm 1 obtains a higher profit than firm 2. A first-mover-
advantage can be observed in the oligopoly under Cournot competition. Of course, 
Neus and Nippel add, this Stackelberg outcome can only be realized if the 
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decision made by the agent of firm 1 can be observed by the manager of firm 2 
and is credible. If that was not the case, the second firm would not be influenced 
by the decision. Dierkes assumes that the decisions taken at stage one of his game 
are observed by the players but he fails to emphasize the importance of this 
aspect. Besides this, Neus and Nippel are puzzled by another property of the 
outcome. Both players will want to be a Stackelberg leader in the game, yet it is 
unclear how the choice of who is allowed to take the first decision is determined. 
If both take their decision under the assumption of being the leader, both end up 
making no profit (and there is no equilibrium as the expectations of the parties are 
not met). 
Second, the authors include transfer prices in their model. As mentioned before, 
since any distortion by itself is bound to have a negative effect the use of transfer 
prices can only be interesting for strategic reasons. So its sole purpose is to 
influence the competitor. Consequently, the outcome will depend on the decisions 
of both players. If only one firm can use transfer prices the owner will use them in 
such a way to make the manager act as if his costs were lower, thereby increasing 
output. Since the choice of the transfer price is made before the decision on 
quantities the result is equal to the Stackelberg outcome. Recall from section 2 
that Dierkes also found the Stackelberg outcome when only one player used STP. 
The difference is however that Neus and Nippel get the Cournot-Stackelberg 
equilibrium while Dierkes’ result is of Bertrand-Stackelberg type as the basic 
assumption on the type of competition differs. 
When Neus and Nippel allow for both players to use transfer prices they find that 
the used transfer price is lower compared to the unilateral case. Additionally, the 
firm who was allowed the use of transfer prices before has now reduced its profit 
while the competitor improves profit in comparison to the unilateral case. 
Nevertheless, both profits are lower than when none makes use of strategic 
transfer prices. Hence, the result is again a prisoners’ dilemma as it was in the 
model of Vickers. This means that competitive intensity is increased. While this 
conclusion implies that the competing parties are worse off it also signifies that 
social welfare as a whole benefits. This is an interesting fact but even more so 
Neus and Nippel describe the use of strategic transfer prices in a market with 
Cournot competition from a new perspective. They state that the use of this 
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instrument is not a means to benefit compared to the original situation but rather a 
defence mechanism against exploitation from the competitor. The authors 
compare it to an arms race which costs a lot of money but needs to be done in 
order to protect against the opponent. Remember however that this holds only for 
competition based on quantities. As was mentioned, the results from Sklivas, 
Fershtman and Judd and Dierkes in Bertrand competition yield completely 
different results. 
Finally, Neus and Nippel study the situation where the transfer price cannot be 
observed by the players. When that is the case, both firms’ principals and agents 
will have to make their decisions based solely on expectations. There is no 
strategic effect in this scenario as the competitor cannot be influenced by the 
transfer price because of its missing observability. Therefore, the owners will 
renounce the use of any distorting variable as the effect can only be negative.95 
The result is both firms relying purely on profit participation as in the initial case 
of reference. The major new finding of Neus and Nippel is therefore that a 
necessary condition for strategic behaviour is not only the existence of not 
simultaneous or multiple decisions but also the observability of the decisions 
taken. Additionally, it is always an advantage to make the value of one’s own 
decision variable public. However, they present no empirics if transfer prices are 
actually made public in oligopolies. Actually, this would need to hold for any 
strategically distorting variable (e.g. the whole details of any incentive contract). 
They do not discuss how such a publication can be achieved and if it is even 
possible in legal terms. Dierkes avoids this problematic by simply assuming 
complete information at any stage. While this is common practice in strategic 
delegation literature, Dierkes fails to discuss possible problems of this 
assumption. 
 
3.1.5. Alles and Datar (1998) 
The paper of Alles and Datar studies strategic transfer prices in a Bertrand 
environment. It uses a variant of the Hotelling model where each of the two firms 
produces multiple products. Costs are the only relevant variable in the model and 
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therefore can obviously differ among the competitors. While Alles and Datar are 
aware that in practice costs are not the only input into the pricing process (e.g. 
demand conditions, requirements of specific customers, etc.) they note that it is 
undoubtedly one of the most important ones. Similar to most other papers 
(including Dierkes), the model assumes no incentive issues (absence of risk 
aversion), no uncertainty about costs or demand, and that all the parameters are 
common knowledge. The authors also give a reason why commonly known costs 
might be a reasonable assumption, stating that the competitor’s costs can be 
determined through benchmarking programs. The validity of this assumption can 
at least be doubted, especially for multi-product firms as information on internal 
processes and value chain are heavily safeguarded in most companies. 
Additionally, equally to Dierkes, the authors assume differentiated products which 
might fit the preferences of some customers more than others through distinctions 
in quality or brand identity. As was mentioned in section 2, this is the only way to 
allow a firm to raise prices above the perfect competitive level. All other major 
assumptions reflect those made by Dierkes, which are standard in the strategic 
delegation literature. 
Similar to previously discussed literature, in order to maximize profits in this 
Bertrand environment, firms will raise prices as much as the market will bear. 
However, due to the Hotelling approach of the model, this price increase is 
limited. There is a countervailing incentive to gain market share by undercutting 
the other firm’s price. Transfer prices are then used to offset this countervailing 
incentive. Alles and Datar find the effect to be that the optimal transfer prices of 
the firms are closer together than their actual marginal costs. The same is true for 
the sales prices. Consequently there is less incentive for a price war and the 
consumers become more indifferent as the price differences are small. 
Accordingly, the average price level can be raised without disrupting the market 
shares. The transfer prices make managers act as if their costs were higher than 
they actually are. For these transfer prices, to become more similar than actual 
marginal costs while still maximizing profits, it is necessary for the owners to 
cross-subsidize their products. This implies that the transfer price for the low-cost 
product is increased, while the one for the high-cost product is decreased. This 
finding is very interesting as such product-cross-subsidizing is commonly 
observed in practice. 
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It was already mentioned in this paper that strategic delegation can only make 
sense if it influences the decision of the competitors, hence in a not perfectly 
competitive market. Alles and Datar prove mathematically that in their model 
both, a monopolist as well as a perfectly competitive firm will choose the transfer 
prices to equal marginal costs, hereby renouncing the additional distorting 
variable. This confirms what has already been shown by Vickers and Fershtman 
and Judd. 
The most interesting finding of this paper is however another aspect. Not 
surprisingly, the authors find that fixed costs play no direct role in the 
determination of the transfer prices or sales prices. This is often the case for a 
constant in a model. Nevertheless, and this is most interesting, fixed costs are 
relevant in establishing market power. Basically, “it is not fixed costs that 
differentiate firms and make fixed cost recovery feasible, but rather their 
successful application to create market power.”96 This means that only if fixed 
costs translate into more market power (on the basis of lower variable cost, higher 
brand identity, etc.) is it possible to also recover these fixed costs in terms of 
higher sales and prices. The mark-up of transfer prices over marginal cost hereby 
becomes directly a function of the firm’s market power. It follows that, “unless 
the firm is already in a hopeless competitive position in a market, it pays for it to 
invest in the creation of market power to gain the leeway to raise prices without 
fear of customer defections.”97 While this result certainly depends on the specific 
Hotelling model assumption made by the authors, it is still a valid aspect that 
should be considered when discussing strategic delegation. 
 
3.1.6. Göx (1999) 
Göx studies strategic delegation through transfer prices in his dissertation. The 
third chapter of his work is the most relevant one for the purposes of this paper as 
the assumptions made in that section reflect those made by Dierkes. He models 
the use of strategic transfer prices in various ways. He analyzes the Stackelberg 
environment first and afterwards the cartel solution. Thirdly, the unilateral use of 
transfer prices is examined and finally symmetric use of transfer prices is 
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investigated. Each time, both the Cournot and the Bertrand case are considered. 
Additionally, he explicitly states the implicit assumption made by Dierkes that 
each possible incentive scheme has the same implementation cost to make it 
easier to compare them. Building on the notation of Bulow, Geanakoplos and 
Klemperer (1985) he finds that in Cournot competition quantities are strategic 
substitutes while in Bertrand competition the prices are strategic complements.98 
“A firm’s decisions are called strategic substitutes when its marginal profits are 
decreasing in the rival’s actions. A firm’s decisions are called strategic 
complements when its marginal profits are increasing in the rival’s actions.”99 
Göx finds the already known result in the Stackelberg situation. The leader will 
have a higher quantity than in the reference case while the follower’s quantity will 
be lower. Both will have higher prices. The difference, as we already know, lies in 
the type of competition. In the Cournot-case the profit of the leader is higher than 
in the reference case, while the follower suffers a profit reduction. In the Bertrand 
case, on the other hand, both firms increase their profits, with the follower gaining 
more benefits. As was already mentioned by Neus and Nippel for the Cournot 
case is now apparent also for the Bertrand case: there is a conceptual problem as 
no party can be assumed to voluntarily choose the unfavourable position in the 
game. Göx suggests that the decision of who will be leader and who will be 
follower has to be determined by the characteristics and history of the market or 
sector. 
The cartel-solution with collusive behaviour would yield the highest profit. This is 
straight-forward. Also, it yields the situation of a prisoners’ dilemma where each 
party has an incentive to deviate from this solution. The solution would then be a 
forcing contract. However, this is not possible, as it would be illegal due to 
violation of anti-trust laws. This is again true for both, the Cournot and the 
Bertrand case. 
In the unilateral case Göx first recalls what had been found by Neus and Nippel, 
namely that the observability of the transfer price by the competitor is crucial for 
its effectiveness in influencing the opponent’s decisions. Similar to Alles and 
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Datar who explained the plausibility of known costs by benchmarking programs, 
Göx also suggests that known transfer prices is a realistic assumption. He states 
that since transfer prices are commonly changed only on a yearly basis it is likely 
that in an oligopolistic market their value becomes common knowledge. Göx does 
not state the process through which this appears to happen which leaves a lot of 
doubt with this explanation. His second possible explanation, while not 
completely satisfactory, is more reasonable. In many corporate groups certain 
divisions are separate legal entities. Information on transfer prices can 
consequently be derived from the financial statements. While it might be possible 
to get a certain idea about the used transfer price, a close derivation of single 
transfer prices for specific products (especially in multi-product firms or 
divisions) can still be doubted. Keeping this critique in mind we see the result 
when using unilateral transfer prices in the model of Göx to be equal to the 
Stackelberg result. Neus and Nippel had proven this already for the case of 
Cournot competition. Göx expands this result also to the Bertrand case. Recall 
from section 2 that this is the same result Dierkes gets in his model in subgame II 
where strategic transfer prices are used unilaterally. Also, same as in those 
discussed cases, the firm using STP automatically becomes the Stackelberg leader 
as the decision on the transfer price precedes the final product pricing decision. 
Note however that in the Cournot case the leader position is an advantage (and the 
follower suffers a loss in profits) while in the Bertrand-case (even though it is 
advantageous for both) the follower benefits more. 
Turning to the case of symmetric use of transfer prices Göx finds the same results 
we already know from the previous discussed authors. When competition is based 
on prices the resulting transfer price lies above actual cost and the competitive 
intensity is reduced as managers are driven to choose an implicitly collusive 
strategy. Consequently, both firms achieve higher profits. On the other hand, 
when competition is based on quantity the transfer price will be below the actual 
cost and the profit of both firms will be lower than in the reference case of profit 
participation. However, the resulting prisoners’ dilemma prevents the principals 
from renouncing the use of transfer prices as they need to protect against 
exploitation by the competitor. In any case, transfer prices provide an additional 
decision variable to influence the market conditions in a favourable way and their 
use is always a dominant strategy. 
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While most of these results were already known, Göx’s major addition to the 
literature lies in the comparative statics. He finds that, in determining the 
difference in optimal transfer prices and consequently sales prices, a crucial factor 
is the similarity of the products. This is comprehensible as the consumers will 
react stronger (ceteris paribus) to a change in sales price (induced by a change in 
the transfer price) the easier it can be substituted by another product.  
Especially under Bertrand competition the effect of transfer prices is higher when 
products are very similar. When they are very different, each firm is already 
acting almost as a monopolist. Since the benefit of transfer prices is to reduce the 
competitive intensity, the effect will be stronger when competitive intensity is 
high. And the latter is the case when the substitutability of products is high. 
Conversely, while the effect of transfer prices becomes larger with increasing 
substitutability, the absolute deviation of the transfer prices from actual costs 
becomes smaller. The reason is basically the same and also intuitive, namely the 
high competitive intensity that does not allow for high mark-ups. 
Most interesting, Göx finds out that the increasing substitutability of products has 
a stronger increasing effect on competitive intensity when competition is based on 
prices compared to the case when it is based on quantity. Through transfer prices 
this difference can be reduced. Also, Göx has shown that comparative statics 
provide interesting insights into a model. Dierkes fails to pursue this possibility in 
his model limiting his conclusions to the most obvious ones. 
 
3.1.7. Mujumdar and Pal (2007) 
In a recent paper Mujumdar and Pal change one key assumption of the typical 
models in the STP literature to get a deeper understanding of the effects of the use 
of strategic transfer prices. Their model based on quantity competition maintains 
most of the standard assumptions also made by Dierkes but changes from a static 
to a dynamic environment. More specifically, the model still has two stages but 
the second stage is subdivided into two periods. In the first stage, the owners still 
choose simultaneously their incentive contract and in the second stage the agents 
decide on their output quantities. However, this second stage in their model has 
two production periods and after the first period the output produced becomes 
common knowledge. The argument for assuming this is that “a firm can usually 
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find out, at some point, before committing to its final output, how much output 
has thus far been produced by its rival(s). This gives a firm the opportunity to 
react to such information by adjusting its production in the subsequent periods.”100 
Firms are therefore given the opportunity to revise their initial output targets after 
the first production period. Additionally, the authors relax the assumption of 
constant marginal costs by allowing them to change from one production period to 
the next (they are still equal for both firms and remain constant within a 
production period). “This is a frequently-made assumption in models with a 
‘dynamic’ production environment.”101 It seems to be fairly realistic, as in practice 
marginal costs may vary over time, e.g. because of changing input prices. 
Since the approach of this model goes beyond the typical framework of this paper 
I will not discuss too many details of the paper but only mention some final 
conclusions that provide interesting hindsight for our purpose. Their major result 
is that when costs remain unchanged or fall moderately there exists an equilibrium 
with one firm acting as pure profit maximizer and the other being a pure sales 
maximizer.102 While we know from Basu (1995) that such a situation can also 
emerge as a result of cost asymmetry among the two firms, there is a huge 
difference in the results. In Basu’s model the firm using strategic transfer prices 
unavoidably becomes the Stackelberg leader while the firm using profit 
participation becomes the Stackelberg follower. In the model of Mujumdar and 
Pal on the other hand it is the profit-maximizer to emerge as Stackelberg leader 
while the rival firm with the manager maximizing sales becomes the Stackelberg 
follower. As in both cases the leader always has the higher profits, the favourable 
choice of incentive contract in the eyes of the owners is quite different. That is to 
say that the outcome changes quite drastically when switching from a static to a 
dynamic model. Besides this, Mujumbar and Pal offer an explanation for 
diverging incentive contracts among firms within the same industry. 
 
To avoid wrong conclusions an important peculiarity has to be noted. In all the 
previously discussed cases where both Cournot and Bertrand competition were 
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studied one could have gained the impression that the Bertrand case would be 
better for the participating firms. This intuition arose because even though the use 
of transfer prices is always a dominant strategy only in the price competition case 
both firms increase their profits compared to the standard Bertrand outcome. In 
the Cournot case on the other hand the result is a prisoners’ dilemma where both 
firms reduce their profits compared to the reference case. Despite this fact, Singh 
and Vives (1984) show that in a symmetric duopoly with linear demand functions 
and substitutable products the profit of the firms is always higher when 
competition is based on quantity compared to competition based on prices. Thus, 
in the standard models price competition is fiercer than quantity competition 
resulting in higher firm profits in the Cournot case. Since the use of STP 
decreases competitive intensity in the Bertrand case while in the Cournot case it is 
increased this implies that the difference between the firms’ profits in the two 
cases is reduced. It is, however, not extinct. This fact should be kept in mind when 
comparing the two different types of competitive markets. 
 
3.2. Related literature on relative performance evaluation 
This subsection will cover the most important literature concerning relative 
performance evaluation as a mechanism of strategic delegation. The literature on 
RPE is not nearly as vast as the one on STP. Nevertheless, fundamental papers 
published before and after Dierkes’ work will be discusses. 
 
3.2.1. Fumas (1992) 
It has already been mentioned that the main theoretical foundation of relative 
performance evaluation as strategic delegation instrument is provided by 
Aggarwal and Samwick (1999). Nevertheless, it was Fumas who first noted that 
the use of RPE in the classic benchmarking approach may cause undesired effects 
in an oligopolistic industry. By benchmarking I mean here that the agent is paid 
not depending on his own firm’s performance but of his firm’s performance 
relative to the market. Basically, principal-agent theory suggests that a bonus is 
paid if the agent achieves above industry returns. The argument behind this 
proposal is that by using this relative performance measure fluctuations beyond 
the manager’s control (common shocks) are flattened out. Hereby incentive 
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contracts become more efficient because risk sharing is improved as uncertainty is 
diminished. Information is used more efficiently and the moral hazard problem is 
alleviated.103 Mathematically speaking this approach corresponds to the use of a 
positive participation rate for the performance of the own firm and a negative 
participation rate for the competitors’ profit. This reduces the executive’s 
exposure to risk but provides an incentive to take actions that lower industry 
returns. Fumas finds that the use of benchmarking in the described form “may 
cause a conflict between the objectives of risk sharing and the implications for 
strategic competition derived from such performance measures, especially if firms 
compete in prices.”104 
The assumptions made by Fumas differ from those made by Dierkes in some key 
aspects. First, Fumas assumes risk averse managers as is the standard principal-
agent approach (the principals are risk neutral as always). Also, the objective 
functions of both, principals and agents, are slightly different. The owners are still 
pure profit maximizers but Fumas uses net profits, namely the firm’s profit net of 
the manager’s salary. In Dierkes’ model this distinction is irrelevant because of 
the assumed risk neutrality of the agent.105 The difference is crucial, however, in 
Fumas’ setting because the agents are assumed to be risk averse. Regarding the 
utility of the agents in Fumas’ model not only are they risk averse in contrast to 
Dierkes but also their incentive scheme is slightly different. For }2,1{, ∈ji  and 
ji ≠
 it is: 
iv
jiii GvGB max→⋅+=  (47) 
Compared to Dierkes, Fumas uses a participation rate only for the competitor’s 
profit implicitly setting the participation rate in the own firm’s profit to one. As 
described in section 2 and shown by Aggarwal and Samwick (1999) this does not 
change any of the conclusions as in the end it is the ratio of the two participation 
rates that effectively determines the incentives. 
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It needs to be noted, that the profit function G  in Fumas’ model is also different 
from Dierkes, as it is based on multiple products and includes the respective 
manager’s effort as well as a common shock term ε  with zero mean and variance 
2σ . In this sense it is a fully specified principal-agent model in the classic sense. 
The findings of Fumas using relative performance evaluation are similar to some 
findings of the strategic transfer pricing literature. Assuming Cournot competition 
he finds that if only one firm uses RPE as incentive scheme the outcome is the 
standard Stackelberg result with that firm being the leader. 
For the symmetric case of both firms using RPE in a Cournot environment Fumas 
finds that through this mechanism the owners can increase their net profits; 
benchmarking allows them to reduce the expected salary of the risk averse 
managers as their amount of risk is reduced. So, according to Fumas, the basic 
suggestion of the classic principal-agent theory for the firm considered in isolation 
without any strategic effects also holds true in the duopoly case with quantity 
competition. Furthermore, compared to the standard Cournot outcome total output 
is now higher (with the more risk averse manager producing more than the less 
risk averse) and gross profit106 is lower. Fumas’ final conclusion for the Cournot 
case is, therefore, that using relative performance evaluation is a dominant 
strategy. In fact, Gibbons and Murphy (1990) find strong empirical support for the 
use of this benchmarking approach in compensation contracts in practice.107 
The situation changes for the Bertrand case. The optimal contracts in this situation 
induce the managers to increase prices and profits by putting a positive weight on 
the competitor’s profit. Fumas is however quite undetermined on his final 
conclusion because of the risk aversion of the managers. The positive 
participation rate in the rival firm’s profit is in conflict with the optimal risk 
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allocation ideas put forward by the principal-agent theory (which in fact suggests 
a negative rate). The positive value is good for strategic reasons but increases the 
risk allocated to the manager (as both firms’ profits move in correlated fashion) 
and hence also increases his expected salary (due to the higher risk premium 
needed in order to match the reservation wage). This latter effect in turn reduces 
the expected net profit by the firm. The opposite is obviously true for a negative 
participation rate. Fumas concludes by stating that the final choice therefore has to 
weight these two conflicting effects and that the participation rate will decrease as 
risk aversion increases. 
 
3.2.2. Aggarwal and Samwick (1999) 
As was already mentioned in several occasions the basic paper regarding relative 
performance evaluation in the strategic delegation literature is provided by 
Aggarwal and Samwick. Their approach starts from the premise of the classic 
principal-agent theory to use benchmarking in incentive contracts. Aggarwal and 
Samwick note however that this benchmarking approach is limited by the need to 
soften the competition in the market. In fact, paying the manager on above 
industry return basis induces strong competitive behaviour driving industry rents 
down. Aggarwal and Samwick’s model is less general (excluding risk aversion 
and effort choice by the managers) than that of Fumas so as to allow them to 
better test their results. They find empirical support that the strategic reason might 
be the cause as to the benchmarking approach suggested by the principal-agent 
theory is not more often followed in practice. In fact, they make the empirical 
prediction that the more competitive the industry is, the less will benchmarking of 
the above described form will be used. 
The model of Aggarwal and Samwick is basically identical to subgame V in the 
paper of Dierkes. The only difference is that the objective functions of the 
principals include a common shock term ε  with zero mean and variance 2σ . The 
profit functions for the firms }2,1{, ∈ji  for ji ≠  hence become: 
( ) ( )
ip
jiii pfpedkpG max→+⋅+⋅−⋅−= ε  (48) 
At the same time, the objective function of the managers becomes: 
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( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )( )
ip
ijjijiiii pfpedkpvpfpedkpsB max→+⋅+⋅−⋅−⋅++⋅+⋅−⋅−⋅= εε
 (49) 
Given the assumed risk neutrality of both owners and managers the common 
shock term does, however, not have any influence on the results. All other major 
assumptions are the same as made by Dierkes. However, while Dierkes only 
models the Bertrand case, Aggarwal and Samwick include both cases, Bertrand 
and Cournot, in their paper. Also, they add an empirical survey to support their 
results. They find that using the classic benchmarking approach in a market 
environment where competition is based on prices encourages more aggressive 
price setting. While common shocks are filtered out this happens at the expense of 
tougher competition. To avoid this, the optimal contracts in equilibrium have 
positive participation rates for both, the own and the competitor firms’ profits. 
Aggarwal and Samwick note that such contracts may seem to violate anti-trust 
laws but refer to Gilo (1996) who shows that in fact they do not. These optimal 
contracts help to soften the competition and increase the returns for both firms 
(this result is identical to the conclusion made by Dierkes). 
The authors’ empirical prediction consequently is that in more competitive 
industries managers are more incentivized to maximize the value of all firms in 
the industry and not just their own. In fact, the optimal contracts in the model 
depend on the values of e  and f from the demand function (1). The ratio f
e
 
measures the degree of substitutability between the products of the two firms. 
When the influence of the own firm’s price ( e ) is much higher than the influence 
of the competitor’s price ( f ) the situation is closer to two separate monopolies. 
Correspondingly, the optimal value of s  increases with e  and decreases as f  
increases. Therefore, in the case of a high ratio f
e
, which corresponds to low 
substitutability, the value of s  is also high. This effect is intuitive as in an almost 
monopoly situation more weight is given to the profits of the own firm. 
Obviously, the opposite is also true. If the ratio decreases products become more 
substitutable and the industry is more competitive. Consequently, more weight is 
given to v  rather than s  and the sales price gets closer to marginal cost. Hence, 
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“the need to soften competition is highest in those industries that are most 
competitive.”108 
The result changes when competition is based on quantities. Aggarwal and 
Samwick find that classic benchmarking with a positive participation rate for own 
firm performance and negative participation for the performance of the competitor 
is indeed the optimal result. Nevertheless, the reason for this outcome is not the 
reduction of risk by filtering out common shocks, as suggested by the principal-
agent theory, but is motivated by strategic interaction. It is a “strategic choice 
rather than a response to moral hazard.”109 The agents are given incentives to 
behave aggressively in order to deter competitors. In fact, the model results in 
higher quantities and lower expected profits. The situation is therefore closer to 
perfect competition than the standard Cournot outcome. The corresponding 
empirical prediction of the authors is that in more competitive industries of 
Cournot type, managers are given stronger incentives to minimize the value of the 
competing firms in their industry than to maximize the value of their own firm. 
Note, that the use of relative performance evaluation in the Cournot situation 
results in a prisoners’ dilemma as was the case with strategic transfer pricing. 
Both firms get lower profits by using RPE but in the case of unilateral use by the 
competitor they are even worse off. Hence, using RPE is a dominant strategy even 
though doing without it would make both firms better off. 
Note also that, same as Göx, Aggarwal and Samwick find that when using relative 
performance evaluation in strategic delegation in the Bertrand situation prices are 
strategic complements while in the Cournot situation quantities are strategic 
substitutes. 
In section 2 it was shown that the results of subgame V in the model of Dierkes 
resemble the result of the Bertrand case in the paper of Aggarwal and Samwick. 
Since the latter focused only on relative performance evaluation they could, 
however, be more complete in their approach. The authors not only included the 
case of Cournot competition but also added a more detailed discussion on the ratio 
f
e
 and its effect on s  and v . Actually, they find that it is the ratio 
v
s
 that 
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determines the incentives in the model and state that s  can be small if v  is also 
small. Conclusively they find that “in general, if the return to effort or the cost of 
effort is negligible, then there is no reason to provide high-powered incentives to 
risk averse managers.”110 Unfortunately, Dierkes is missing any deeper discussion 
or a sensitivity analysis of the effects of changing values of his parameters. 
Besides these features, Aggarwal and Samwick enrich their paper by showing that 
using a fully integrated principal-agent model including an effort choice, a 
disutility of effort, a common shock and risk aversion would not change the major 
conclusions of their initial model. Also, they show that through the use of a 
signalling game (with information asymmetry) in the Bertrand case the need for 
observable contracts can be eliminated. 
Finally, an empirical study is included in their paper. The predictions are tested 
against the ratio f
e
 measuring the competitive intensity of the market. Generally 
they find that “as products become more substitutable (markets become more 
competitive), an executive’s pay will depend less on own firm performance and 
more on the performance of the rival firms.”111 This result is statistically 
significant and was intuitively expected as described before. Three other major 
conclusions emerge from the study. First, the authors find that participation rates 
s  and v  are positive. Second, the ratio of the two participation rates 
v
s
 is lower 
in more competitive industries. This means that when competition is intense, more 
(relative) weight is given to the competitor firm’s profit to reduce the intensity of 
competition. These two findings support the Bertrand model. Third, in short-term 
compensation data they find some evidence for classic benchmarking with a 
negative v  but limited by strategic competition. And the more competitive the 
industry is, the less negative the rival firm’s participation rate becomes. Also, the 
magnitudes of s  and v  are consistent with the values expected by the model. All 
together, the empirical study supports the differentiated Bertrand model and could 
explain the practical lack of classic benchmarking. 
 
                                                            
110
 Aggarwal/Samwick (1999), p. 2032. 
111
 Aggarwal/Samwick (1999), p. 2017. 
 56 
3.2.3. Miller and Pazgal (2002) 
Even though the work of Miller and Pazgal was published a few years after the 
paper of Aggarwal and Samwick, they approach the same topic without reference 
to this previously written paper. Nevertheless, and even though their approach is 
quite similar, they offer some interesting additional insight. 
Different to Fumas, and Aggarwal and Samwick the setup of Miller and Pazgal 
does not model relative performance evaluation via an incentive contract. They 
assume that “managers have a variety of different attitudes toward relative 
performance.”112 They assume a continuous set of managers of different “types”, 
from very aggressive ones to very cooperative ones. Aggressive managers place 
more weight on outperforming competitors while cooperative managers want 
good results for their own and their rival firms (“a healthy industry is essential to 
a healthy firm”113). The objective function for the agents in their model is the 
same as in (47) used by Fumas.114 
The difference is however that Fumas models profits in terms of multiple products 
including an effort choice and a common shock term while Miller and Pazgal 
follow the approach of Vickers, Sklivas and Fershtman and Judd. In this sense, all 
the major assumptions in this model are equal to those made by Dierkes. Again, 
the major difference is that the relative performance approach is modelled in the 
type of the manager and not in their incentive contract. Using this approach has 
two major advantages according to the authors. First, it avoids the net payoff 
problem. However, it was already mentioned in this paper that the payoff of the 
manager can be set to his respective reservation wage if risk neutrality by the 
managers and complete information is assumed, as done by Miller and Pazgal. 
Consequently, the net payoff approach is obsolete. Second, including RPE in the 
type of the manager avoids any anti-trust issues with cooperative managers being 
paid a positive participation rate in their competitors’ profits. Again, it was shown 
by Gilo (1996) that such passive investment positions do not violate anti-trust 
laws. Therefore, this argument is also irrelevant. As a conclusion it can be said, 
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that modelling RPE via incentive contract or via the types of managers does not 
appear to make any relevant difference. 
Note also that Miller and Pazgal use only one participation rate parameter, namely 
only for the competitor’s profit. This is the same approach as was used by Fumas. 
Again, this implicitly means that s  in the model of Aggarwal and Samwick is set 
to one. Aggarwal and Samwick used participation rates for both, the own firm’s 
profit and the competitor’s profit. While this latter approach is more complete, the 
authors showed that in the end what effectively determinates the incentives is the 
ratio of the two participation rates. Hence, it is not a problem using only one 
participation rate as the conclusions basically remain the same. 
Regarding the demand function in the model of Miller and Pazgal they 
differentiate using both, a model with substitute goods and one with 
complementary goods. Most previously discussed authors, including Dierkes, 
assumed simply substitute goods. Miller and Pazgal, however, note the well 
known fact from oligopoly theory that this distinction is not material. Price 
competition with complementary goods and quantity competition with 
complementary goods both result in dealing with strategic substitutes. Hence, the 
cases are symmetric. Discussing one implies that the same conclusion can be 
applied to the other case. The same is true for the case of strategic complements, 
being either substitute goods in price competition or complementary goods in 
quantity competition. Hence, the discussion reduces to the case of strategic 
substitutes vs. strategic complements.115 It should be noted that Dierkes simply 
focuses on one special case but fails to mention possible implications or 
differences of changing assumptions. 
The last significant difference in the assumptions of Miller and Pazgal compared 
to Dierkes is that they also consider cost differences among the two firms. They 
find that under Cournot competition, and independent of considering strategic 
substitutes or strategic complements, the principal of the firm with lower 
production costs will hire the more aggressive manager (negative v ). Hence, as 
was found by previous models, Cournot competition supports the classic 
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benchmarking approach. Total profits (sum of both firms’ profits) are smaller, 
total quantity is larger and total welfare is higher than in the standard Cournot 
case; the model is closer to perfect competition. Also, it has the socially desirable 
effect of the firm with lower costs having the higher market share. While the firms 
are worse off using RPE it is still a dominant strategy as unilateral deviation 
would result in even lower profits. These results reflect previous research and 
confirm the prisoners’ dilemma situation in the quantity competition case. 
However, if the cost for the more efficient firm is low enough it can achieve a 
profit even higher than in the standard Cournot case (the less efficient firm is 
always worse off). Therefore it is intuitive that the model predicts the low cost 
firm to hire the more aggressive manager in order to exploit this relative cost 
advantage. 
Interestingly, Miller and Pazgal show for the Cournot case that using relative 
performance evaluation as incentive scheme (even though they model it as part of 
the type of manager) has some other features we already know from the literature 
on strategic transfer pricing. First, they prove that as the number of firms increases 
the model approaches perfect competition. In this case the owners hire only pure 
profit maximizers without any incentive distortion. Second, when the selection of 
the manager is sequential the owner allowed to choose first hires the more 
aggressive manager and the result is the classic Stackelberg outcome. The leader 
produces more and will make larger profits than in the simultaneous case while 
the opposite is true for the follower. Total industry production is also higher while 
total profits are lower. 
While for the Cournot case the conclusions made where basically the same for 
complements and for substitutes this changes in the Bertrand situation. In this 
latter case the result is that the produced quantity is always lower while the price 
is always higher. However, profits are larger when goods are substitutes (which 
explains the term strategic complements in the price competition case – this is the 
case assumed by Dierkes) while they are lower assuming goods are complements 
(hence, strategic substitutes). In other words, when strategic substitutes are 
assumed, then a value of 0<v  increases competitiveness and reduces total 
profits. On the other hand, assuming strategic complements a value of 0>v  
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makes the firms’ managers more cooperative which in turn increases total profits. 
These are the same conclusions found by Fumas and Aggarwal and Samwick. 
Finally, Miller and Pazgal note another very interesting fact about the use of 
relative performance evaluation. We know from Singh and Vives (1984) that in 
the standard models price competition is fiercer than quantity competition 
resulting in higher firm profits in the Cournot case. Since the use of RPE 
(assuming goods are substitutes) decreases competitive intensity in the Bertrand 
case while in the Cournot case it increases, it is implied that the difference 
between the firms’ profits is reduced compared to the standard models. Remember 
that the same effect was noted using strategic transfer prices. 
 
3.2.4. Albuquerque (2009) 
In a recent paper Albuquerque provides some additional insight into the use of 
relative performance evaluation in incentive contracts. In her model she assumes 
cost heterogeneous firms in Cournot competition where contracts are not 
observable. This setup is slightly different to the ones used by Fumas, Aggarwal 
and Samwick, and Miller and Pazgal; moreover, it is certainly very different from 
the model of Dierkes. However, it shows a very interesting effect in the quantity 
competition case under certain conditions. Previous authors had uniformly shown 
that incentive distortion schemes intensify competition in the Cournot case. 
Albuquerque on the other hand shows that there is a countervailing effect if the 
production cost difference of the firms is sufficiently large. If that is the case and 
product substitutability (again measured by the ratio f
e ) increases than the low 
cost firms gives incentives to soften competition in his model. The explanation is 
that as the ratio, and hence the effect of the competitor’s price, increases 
competition becomes more intense. Consequently, the owner of the more efficient 
firm wants to give incentives in order to reduce competition. The participation rate 
in the competitor’s profit ( v ) is therefore less negative in the optimal contract. 
Nevertheless, it is still negative, so the effect is not strong enough to induce truly 
cooperative behaviour where any incentive to hurt the returns in the industry is 
removed. The most interesting fact, however, is that the high cost firm never 
engages in any effort to reduce competition. Consequently, Albuquerque’s model 
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provides an explanation why incentive contracts can vary across firms with 
different cost structure (with cost being a major source of performance disparity 
among firms). The same is true for firms of different sizes, if one assumes larger 
firms to be more efficient. Anyway, in the light of these recent findings one could 
criticize Dierkes’ assumption of symmetric costs of being too simplistic. 
 
3.3. Combinations of incentive mechanisms 
In this subsection I will discuss two other interesting papers related to the subject 
which are not directly attributable to either strategic transfer pricing or relative 
performance evaluation. The first one because it does not focus on any of those 
two bonus schemes but discusses a third, additional or alternative, possible 
incentive distortion mechanism. The second paper on the other hand deals with 
both, STP and RPE, and even includes a third bonus scheme. In this sense these 
very recent papers expand the strategic incentive distortion literature. 
 
3.3.1. Jansen, van Lier and van Witteloostuijn (2007) 
Jansen et al. use another bonus scheme besides strategic transfer pricing and 
relative performance evaluation, namely market share. They note that market 
share may also be a crucial motive for firm owners and can be part of an incentive 
contract. Recall from Alles and Datar (1998) that in their variant of the Hotelling 
model, transfer prices were used to prevent the manager to undercutting the 
competitors prices in order to gain market share. Jansen et al. on the other hand 
include market share directly as a component of the incentive contract of the 
manager. Consequently the objective function of the manager in their model is the 
following: 
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with 
iw   Incentive parameter for the market share 
iq  Quantity produced by firm i 
Q   Total quantity produced by all firms in the market 
The authors assume iw  to be non-negative in their model. While it seems 
plausible to only give a positive bonus for an increase in market share it remains 
unclear why the model should be restricted such to exclude the case where the 
manager would be “punished” for an increase in market share. 
Following the previous literature they discuss this new incentive distortion 
scheme in a duopoly and for the case of multiple competing firms. They stick to 
the standard assumptions of the literature which are essentially the same as the 
ones used by Dierkes. Regarding the type of competition, however, they focus on 
the Cournot case while only briefly touching on the Bertrand environment. In 
addition, they compare their results to the ones obtained by Vickers, Fershtman 
and Judd, and Sklivas. 
The results of the model show that if both firms use incentive mechanisms based 
on profits and market share (symmetric case) then including the non-profit 
incentive causes the manager of that firm to behave more aggressively. He 
produces more in order to force the competing manager to reduce his output. As 
both managers act this way, total output in the market increases compared to the 
standard Cournot outcome. Consequently, total profits in the market (and 
obviously also the profits of the single firms as the case is symmetric) are lower 
than in the reference solution. This is the same effect already known from the 
literature on strategic transfer prices. However, profits remain slightly higher 
using market share instead of transfer prices. Nevertheless, social welfare (defined 
by the sum of consumer and producer surplus) is somewhat lower. This is possible 
because the slight increase in market imperfection has a redistribution effect and 
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causes a notable shift of surplus from the demand to the supply side. All this is 
true for the case of two as well as for multiple firms. 
To deal with the asymmetric case where firm principals might choose different 
incentive schemes Jansen et al. adapt the approach by Basu (1995) of including an 
additional stage where the owners can choose whether or not to hire a manager.116 
Not surprisingly, as was the case with STP and RPE, if one owner decides not to 
hire a manager this leads to the Stackelberg output. Their conclusion is that 
overall it is a dominant strategy to hire a manager with both, profit and market 
share incentives. This choice is in any case better than choosing either pure profit 
maximization or an incentive scheme based on profits and sales. Nevertheless, 
doing so results in lower profits compared to the standard Cournot case. It is 
therefore confirmed what has been shown using STP or RPE in a situation of 
quantity competition, namely that the result is a prisoners’ dilemma situation. 
As mentioned before, the authors only briefly touch upon the Bertrand version of 
their model. They find that similar to the Cournot case the profits of the firms are 
higher when both firm owners use incentives based on profits and market share 
compared to the (symmetric) choice of strategic transfer prices. Nonetheless, they 
do not discuss effects on (total or firm) output, social welfare or any asymmetric 
case (and hence whether or not including the market share objective in incentives 
might still be a dominant strategy). These aspects would have been interesting, 
especially in comparison with the results of Dierkes.  
 
3.3.2. Jansen, van Lier and van Witteloostuijn (2009) 
Expanding on their own paper of 2007, Jansen et al. choose an approach very 
similar to Dierkes in there more recent paper. In fact, they pick four different 
bonus systems and play all possible combinations of them in a duopoly delegation 
game. Three of the selected possible incentive contracts are the same as the ones 
used by Dierkes, that is to say pure profit evaluation, sales evaluation (which was 
already mentioned is the same as the use of strategic transfer prices) and relative 
performance evaluation (even though Jansen et al. follow Fumas and Miller and 
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Pazgal by using only one parameter, namely the weight for the competitor’s 
profit117). Additionally, they also incorporate the approach of including the market 
share criteria as an incentive, which was introduced by Jansen et al. in their paper 
of 2007. 
The model in this paper is very similar to the approach of Dierkes. However, there 
is one crucial difference: while Dierkes assumed Bertrand competition, Jansen et 
al. deal with the Cournot case in their model. Therefore, this paper closes an 
important gap left by Dierkes. All other major assumptions are the same and 
standard in the literature. It should be noted however that Jansen et al. do not only 
discuss the duopoly case but consider also a market of three firms.118 
Regarding the duopoly situation, instead of discussing all 16 subgames in their 
paper, they refer to previous work for those already covered in the literature (most 
of them are among the papers covered in this section). The case of symmetric 
choice of strategic transfer prices is covered by the works of Vickers (1985), 
Sklivas (1987) and Fershtman and Judd (1987). For the case of STP against pure 
profit maximization they refer to Basu (1995). Miller and Pazgal are their 
reference for the case of symmetric relative performance evaluation. Finally, 
Jansen et al. (2007) is indicated as the source for the cases of symmetric use of the 
market share approach and the asymmetric case of this last approach against 
strategic transfer prices. The standard Cournot result remains the reference 
solution. So the only subgames that remain to be explicitly covered in their paper 
are the ones playing relative performance evaluation against strategic transfer 
prices and against the market share approach. Quite surprisingly, the result for 
both is the same and equal to the standard Stackelberg outcome. In fact the firm 
using RPE produces twice as much and generates twice the profit of the 
competitor. The latter is basically “forced” to use pure profit maximization as its 
best response results in setting it  or iw  respectively equal to zero. The firm using 
relative performance evaluation thus becomes a Stackelberg leader, a position 
characterizes by a first-mover advantage in a Cournot oligopoly.119 
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Putting all the pieces together and solving the full game it emerges that using 
relative performance evaluation is a dominant strategy. Even when the authors 
include the additional stage suggested by Basu (1995) where owners can choose 
whether to hire a manager or not, this result does not change. The conclusion is 
that emphasizing pure profits too much (as done in many companies in practice) 
can lead to a strategically weak position. 
This conclusion for the duopoly does not change much even when the market 
environment switches to including three competing firms. Relative performance 
evaluation still remains the dominant strategy. Additionally, “if no owner uses a 
bonus based on pure profits, the highest producer surplus – or highest industry-
level profitability – corresponds with the case where all firms reward their 
managers on the basis of relative profits evaluation.”120 
The result for the Cournot case is consequently similar to the one obtained by 
Dierkes in the Bertrand case (even though the latter does not include the market 
share approach). Independently of whether competition is based on prices or 
quantities, RPE is always the dominant strategy. The implications for any 
practical implementation are, however, very different for the two cases regarding 
the design of the key parameter. In the Cournot case benchmarking, in the 
classical sense, with a negative participation rate in the competitor’s profit is 
suggested. The recommendation for the Bertrand case on the other hand is the use 
of a positive v . Another major difference is that while in a Bertrand environment 
both firms achieve the highest profits using relative performance evaluation, the 
Cournot case results in a prisoners’ dilemma. If in the latter situation both owners 
chose pure profit maximization (or decided not to hire a manager) they would 
yield higher profits than using RPE. However, they are “pushed” to use this 
incentive scheme in order to protect against opportunism from the competing 
firm. 
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4. Critical discussion of Dierkes’ model 
 
Section 3 has shown that there is considerable literature dealing with the issue of 
strategic delegation. However, almost all of them deal exclusively with one 
specific mechanism in comparison to the reference case. Some at least consider 
both Cournot and Bertrand environments. By far the most discussed approach is 
the use of strategic transfer prices.121 The second most considered scheme is the 
use of relative performance evaluation. Even though this latter mechanism is 
covered relatively less in the literature compared to STP, the approach seems 
natural, as the use of RPE in the classic benchmarking approach is already 
suggested for risk-sharing purposes by the principal-agent theory. In every piece 
of work on strategic delegation discussed in this paper the conclusion was that the 
use of the respectively covered mechanism was beneficial to the firm under 
certain circumstances. In fact, most of them even identified their approach to be a 
dominant strategy in any case given their respective assumptions. So the common 
tenor is that it is beneficial for the firm to engage in strategic delegation through 
the use of either STP or RPE. Until Dierkes however, the question of which of 
these two central mechanisms was better had never been answered. Dierkes’ paper 
therefore was the first to bring these two previously separately progressing lines 
of literature together and allow for a direct confrontation. Hence, it can be 
considered a ground-setting approach which is why it has the central role in this 
paper. 
When discussing the related literature in section 3, I have shown that in pursuing 
the solution to this well-selected problem Dierkes had to make some restrictive 
choices. To be able to deal with his relatively more complicated model setup the 
author made many assumptions. While most of them are standard in the literature 
on oligopolies and strategic delegation, others appear to be overly simplistic. This 
may well be necessary in order to deal with such a complex problem. 
Nevertheless, the reader may be misled as Dierkes fails to adequately discuss the 
possible consequences of relaxing certain of his assumptions. Additionally, 
certain implicit assumptions or possible problems are not even mentioned and 
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completely ignored. This might cause the reader to remain unaware of certain 
implications or practical problems. 
This section is devoted to fill this gap and to discuss the paper of Dierkes in the 
light of the additional understanding gained by the study of the most relevant 
related literature. In the four subsections of this section I will first re-evaluate the 
assumptions made in Dierkes’ model and discuss good features as well as the 
problematic aspects of certain choices. In subsection 4.2 I will turn to omitted 
aspects, problems and discussions of which one becomes only aware by studying 
the related literature. Several implications and practical relevance will be 
discussed in subsection 4.3, complemented by some empirical findings and 
indications for implementation in real world situations. Finally, subsection 4.4 
gives an outlook on future research possibilities that could help expand Dierkes’ 
model and widen its general validity. In this sense this section works as a useful 
supplement for the reader of Dierkes’ paper to get a better understanding and 
critical view of his findings. 
 
4.1. Assumptions in Dierkes’ model 
The main purpose of the paper by Dierkes is to confront strategic transfer prices 
and relative performance evaluation to see which mechanism is the better 
approach in strategic delegation. In order to do so he makes the implicit 
assumption that the implementation cost for both incentive schemes (and in fact 
also for the reference case of pure profit participation) is the same and equal to 
zero. While this assumption is obviously fairly unrealistic it is nevertheless a 
necessary assumption in order to be able to make a comparison based solely on 
the strategic effects. This is also why it is among the standard assumptions in the 
strategic delegation literature. 
Another quite unrealistic assumption in the model of Dierkes is the duopoly 
environment. A market of only two competitors is very rare in practice. However, 
the duopoly case is the standard approach when studying oligopolies, a situation 
far more common in the real world. The properties are normally the same in a 
duopoly model as in an oligopoly with more than two firms but the effects are far 
more pronounced when only two competitors are present. As we have seen in 
section 3 in the works of Vickers (1985), Fershtman and Judd (1987), Alles and 
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Datar (1998), Miller and Pazgal (2002), Jansen et al. (2007) and Jansen et al. 
(2009) the implications remain the same if the number of firms is increased, 
although the effect tends to fade out the closer one moves towards a perfect 
competitive market. The assumption is therefore perfectly legitimate. 
Nevertheless, the reader of Dierkes’ paper should be aware that the magnitudes 
may change if the number of competitors in the market is increased. 
A further assumption which hold true only very rarely in practice is the 
supposition that both firms produce only one single type of product. Nevertheless, 
this is also a frequently made assumption as allowing multiple products severely 
increases the complexity of an oligopoly model. Furthermore, Fumas (1992) has 
shown for RPE that the basic implications do not change. Alles and Datar (1998) 
have done the same for the use of STP. The latter ones, nevertheless, have shown 
that while the main conclusions remain unchanged there are some other 
interesting effects, for example cross-subsidization of products. Hence, the reader 
can accept the assumption since the major corollaries do not change but needs to 
be aware that a more realistic multiple product setting increases complexity by 
several dimensions. These would need to be considered in case one considers 
practical implementation of one of the discussed incentive schemes within a firm 
producing more than one product. 
Dierkes mentions that the products produced by the two firms are differentiated. 
This is necessary to avoid the Bertrand-Paradox.122 He does however not 
explicitly mention that the goods are assumed to be substitutes. This becomes 
obvious though when looking at the parameter assumptions of the demand 
function (1) and is standard in strategic delegation literature. This proposition 
becomes very important in combination with another crucial assumption, namely 
that competition is based on prices. These two factors together (substitutes vs. 
complements and Bertrand vs. Cournot) determine whether one is dealing with 
strategic complements or strategic substitutes. Miller and Pazgal (2002) noted that 
price competition with complementary goods and quantity competition with 
substitute goods both result in dealing with strategic substitutes and thus the two 
cases yield identical results. The same is true for the case of strategic 
complements, being either complementary goods in quantity competition or 
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substitute goods in price competition. It is this very last case we find in the model 
of Dierkes, which does not cover the case of strategic substitutes. Fortunately, this 
void has been filled since than by the work of Jansen et al. (2009). Opportunely, 
the main conclusion in both papers is the same, namely that using relative 
performance evaluation is always a dominant strategy. Nevertheless, the way this 
strategy is optimally implemented is completely different for the two cases.123 As 
Dierkes fails to mention that his suggestions might change drastically if one of 
these key assumptions is changed (so that the situation changes from involving 
strategic complements to dealing with strategic substitutes) the reader of his paper 
might not be aware of this restriction. 
Regarding the demand function in Dierkes’ model it does not only include the 
implicit assumption of the goods being substitutes but has some other interesting 
properties worth noting. First and most obvious, it is linear. This specification is 
also standard in oligopoly theory as it allows to yield straightforward comparative 
statics. Moreover, the results remain unchanged for nonlinear demand functions 
with certain properties.124 Second, the demand function is symmetric for the 
products of both firms. Because of the Slutsky-Symmetry this is always the case 
when it is derived from the utility maximizing consumption plan of a 
representative household.125 Hence, linear and symmetric demand functions are 
standard assumptions. 
Even though the demand function (1) is intuitive and standard for a Bertrand 
duopoly, it is not without issue. In addition to the more or less realistic implicit 
assumptions discussed in the previous two paragraphs, it has other properties 
which are questionable from an economic point of view. Kopel and Lambertini 
(2012) show that for an increasing f  (which corresponds to a decreasing product 
differentiation) both price and profits decrease monotonically. In economics, one 
would expect the opposite to hold. Additionally, assuming full substitutability (
1=f ) instead of the economically reasonable zero profits and marginal cost 
pricing, they find prices which remain above marginal cost and profits to be 
positive. Finally, they get the unreasonable result with this demand function of 
“the duopoly price with homogeneous goods to be higher than full monopoly 
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price.”126 This finding might seriously influence the economic validity of Dierkes’ 
results. 
Another standard assumption in this area of research is marginal costs being 
constant127 even though it might seem quite unrealistic. The fact however that 
costs are also assumed to be symmetric needs a little more consideration. 
Obviously, this appears to be only very rarely the case in practice. This is one 
reason why some of the papers discussed in section 3 assumed cost 
heterogeneity.128 It is no surprise that this difference plays a crucial role in 
determining the outcome. A firm’s cost structure is a major factor of its 
competitiveness. So if through incentive contracts competitive intensity can be 
reduced or increased the effect is certainly facilitated or aggravated by differences 
in production costs. On the other hand, it consequently enhances significantly the 
complexity of such a model. Hence, it is not a coincidence that the assumption of 
cost heterogeneity was not included in the paper of Dierkes nor by Jansen et al. 
(2009) but merely by others studying only one incentive distortion scheme. 
Dierkes used a symmetric cost function not because the assumption seemed 
realistic but solely to avoid making his model too complex. The reader of the 
paper should, nevertheless, be aware that dropping this assumption might have a 
radical influence on the outcome. As the works of Basu (1995) and Albuquerque 
(2009) have shown it might even lead to a situation in which the dominant 
strategy (and therefore the used incentive distortion approach) differs for the 
owners of the two firms. In fact, this might be one reason why even within the 
same industry in practice we still do not observe uniformity among incentive 
contracts. The reader of Dierkes’ article should keep this important aspect in 
mind. 
This is not the only unrealistic assumption that if changed might seriously alter 
the main conclusions. Dierkes’ paper is based on a static model with a game 
excluding repetition and in which the players choose simultaneously. If the choice 
about an incentive scheme for the owners happens to be sequential instead of 
simultaneous because of the structure of the sector or for any other reason the 
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outcome changes drastically. These cases have been covered by Göx (1999) for 
the use of STP and by Miller and Pazgal (2002) for RPE. Both find that the use 
the respective incentive scheme remains a dominant strategy but that the optimal 
contract parameters have changed and are not symmetric anymore. For the case 
where the owners have a choice of different incentive distortion approaches, as in 
Dierkes’, it could even be imagined that the best reaction of the follower might 
involve a different choice than the one made by the leader. Furthermore, 
Albuquerque (2007) shows that a dynamic (and more realistic) model with 
changing parameters and/or possible observations of certain choices might also be 
a cause for drastically changed results. In this sense, the simultaneous choice and 
the static model are key assumptions that if dropped might make the model more 
realistic but could decisively alter the conclusions as was the case for symmetric 
costs. The reader of Dierkes’ paper should be aware of this fact. 
Another important issue is the assumption of complete information. Neus and 
Nippel (1996) and Göx (1999) have shown that the effectiveness of incentive 
distortion schemes stands and falls with the observability of the contract 
parameters by the competitors. Katz (1991) had already shown that unobservable 
contracts cannot serve as precomittments if “it is common knowledge that there 
exists a contract that ‘solves’ the standard agency problems and that the principal 
and agent have the same preferences over income and effort.”129 He shows 
however also that if these conditions are not met than the use of an agent can 
affect the outcome even when contracts are not observable. Fershtman and Kalai 
(1997) also study situations were commitment via delegation is beneficial even 
when the contracts are unobservable. They find that this critically depends on the 
type of delegation (incentive delegation is found to be more efficient than 
instructive delegation), whether unobservability is certain or only very likely, the 
game being one shot or repeated (repeated games are found to be more efficient) 
and the equilibrium concept used in the analysis (they use a trembling hand 
model). Similar, Aggarwal and Samwick (1999) show with a signalling game that 
strategic delegation can be effective even if information asymmetry is assumed. 
Schiller (2000) shows for a model of strategic transfer prices that already the 
slightest uncertainty about the competitors transfer price cause the value of self-
commitment to vanish. However, he also shows that it can be beneficial again if 
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there is at the same time uncertainty about the marginal cost of the competing 
firm. Possible effects of dropping the observability assumption are therefore not 
completely determined. Nevertheless, Neus and Nippel (1996) find that making 
contract details public is a dominant strategy for the firm and Schiller (2000) adds 
that keeping marginal cost information secret is also beneficial. Nonetheless, this 
is rarely observed in practice. Göx (1999) is convinced that since many divisions 
in large companies are actually organized as separate legal entities it is possible to 
derive the used transfer prices from the financial statements. Schiller strongly 
doubts this130 as do I, especially when considering companies producing multiple 
products and engaging in cross-subsidizing. Dierkes’ point of view is that the 
observation of the participation rates will be less problematic than for transfer 
prices but does not give any arguments why this might hold. Fact remains that in 
practice incentive contract details are rarely made public and the reader of 
Dierkes’ article should know that in such a situation incentive distortion through 
strategic delegation may be useless or at least have reduced effectiveness. 
Complete information refers, however, not only to the observability of the 
incentive contract parameters but also to the cost and demand functions which 
both managers face. It is natural to assume that a manager has an idea about the 
costs and demand he and his competitor are facing. However, having perfect 
knowledge of it is a very rigid assumption. This is why the standard principal-
agent theory normally includes some kind of random shock term in order to reflect 
the risk the manager is facing. Assuming complete information Dierkes does not 
include such a term in his model. The reason for doing so lies within another 
assumption, namely that the agent is risk neutral and his performance does not 
involve any effort. These are assumptions made quite commonly in the strategic 
delegation literature in order to be able to focus on the strategic effects of 
incentive distortion without having to worry too much about any moral hazard 
problems. The inclusion of a random variable becomes obsolete in this case as in 
the absence of risk aversion the linear wage contract of the agent can always be 
constructed in such a way to equal exactly his reservation wage.131 Additionally, 
Fershtman and Judd (1987) show that including a random variable does not 
change the main conclusions in their STP model. Regarding relative performance 
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evaluation it is Fumas (1992) who first notes that using a fully specified agency 
model including risk-aversion, an effort choice and a common shock term in a 
strategic delegation model may cause a conflict with the implications of the 
standard principal-agent theory, especially in the Bertrand case. In fact, while the 
principal-agent theory suggests negative participation rates for the competitor’s 
profit, the strategic delegation literature proposes a positive value for this variable. 
Aggarwal and Samwick (1999) on the other hand show that adapting their RPE 
model to a fully specified agency model does not change its implications. 
Nevertheless, the magnitudes of the variable values of their optimal contracts are 
altered. Therefore, it cannot be said with certainty what the final effect of 
including the moral hazard problem in Dierkes’ model would be and how the 
outcome might be altered. The reader should however notice that doing so might 
change the main implications, or if not, at least the magnitudes of the optimal 
parameters will be different. 
The absence of an asymmetric information structure and the moral hazard 
problem appears to make another of Dierkes’ assumption obsolete. In fact, the 
existence of these prepositions is the foundation in the principal-agent theory for 
justifying the use of (linear) incentive contracts. Even though there is no moral 
hazard problem in Dierkes’ model, the use of incentive contracts is justified by its 
incentive distorting properties. The restriction of these contracts to be linear is 
probably made on one hand to be consistent with the principal-agent framework 
and on the other hand to make the model analytically traceable. This seems 
however not to be problematic as the assumption is standard in the strategic 
delegation literature and linear incentive contracts are by far the most dominant 
form of such contracts in practice. 
Finally, it is implicitly assumed that for the contracts made between principals and 
agents there is no possibility of renegotiation. This point is important because 
Katz (1991) shows that renegotiable contracts are in many ways similar to 
unobservable contracts and that as a conclusion the commitment value of the 
contract can vanish.132 The question if and how often contract renegotiation is the 
case in practice will probably vary among firms, industries and time and is beyond 
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the purpose of this paper. This is however an additional aspect which should be 
kept in mind by the reader of Dierkes’ article. 
 
4.2. Aspects not discussed by Dierkes 
In this subsection aspects and problems that Dierkes fails to discuss are going to 
be picked up. Hereby it makes no difference whether Dierkes implicitly assumed 
the reader to be aware of these characteristics or whether forgot or was 
unconscious about these omissions. 
Actually, some have already been mentioned in the previous subsection when 
discussing explicit or implicit assumptions. I have discussed some problems with 
certain assumptions and possible effects if these assumptions were to be dropped. 
This is important to know, especially when the assumptions might appear 
unrealistic as the outcomes in the real world could consequently be very different. 
Omitting a detailed discussion of these aspects might lead the incautious reader to 
give the model a greater validity than it actually has. Accordingly, it has been 
mentioned that the effects of strategic delegation lessen as the number of firms in 
the market increases. Also, the optimal contracts change drastically when 
switching from strategic complements to strategic substitutes or when using a 
fully specified agency model. Finally, Dierkes fails to justify the use of linear 
incentive contracts in his model and does not sufficiently point out the importance 
of the observability of the contracts. As these aspects have already been dealt with 
I will refer to the previous subsection for the detailed discussion. 
Beyond these problems there are however additional aspects of which one only 
becomes aware by reading the related literature as Dierkes does not mention them. 
Speaking of the observability of the contracts, the author not only fails to 
sufficiently emphasize its importance but also does not engage in a discussion of 
how these details might or might not become common knowledge in practice. As 
mentioned in the previous subsection, Göx (1999) implausibly suggests that 
transfer prices can be derived from the financial statements of firms. Dierkes is 
convinced that it would be easier to observe the participation rates of competing 
firms rather than their transfer prices but without giving any reasons for this 
belief. One mechanism of making contract details observable to the public might 
be that the firms announce them themselves. Fershtman and Judd (1987) as well 
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as Neus and Nippel (1996) and Schiller (2000) suggest that this is in fact a 
dominant strategy for the firm. Furthermore, such a publication would be 
beneficial in terms of corporate transparency. We can indeed observe in practice 
that some companies reveal their top managers compensation package, especially 
in listed companies. Nevertheless, such announcements are normally restricted to 
the board level and are not nearly as wide-spread as the discussed findings would 
suggest. Considering that most of the benefits of strategic incentive distortion go 
to the principals (according to the models) that there seems not to be any apparent 
reason why the managers should provide the consent to make their contract details 
public. If the approval by the agent is a legal prerequisite, this might explain why 
companies do not actually publish them. There might, however, well be other than 
strategic reasons frustrating such publication efforts. 
One important aspect that is not emphasized sufficiently by Dierkes in his paper is 
the question why he restricts himself to comparing STP and RPE. He does 
mention in his conclusion that there might be other incentive distorting 
mechanisms but fails to discuss why he limits himself to these two. It seems 
obvious that this is done because of several reasons. First, transfer prices (for 
strategic reasons or not) and relative performance evaluation are two very 
commonly used concepts in practice. Second, these are also the two mainly 
discussed incentive schemes in the strategic delegation literature. Finally, many 
other mechanisms are mathematically equivalent to one of these two. Considering 
this, the limitation to discussing STP versus RPE seems straightforward. 
However, as we have seen from Jansen et al. (2009), there might well be 
additional contract schemes having different effects and these may even dominate 
one or both of the others. So while the choice of the two mechanism made by 
Dierkes is completely sensible, the reader should be aware that the results may 
provide an optimum within his model framework but that there might also be 
other schemes that could offer even better results. I am however not aware that so 
far the literature does offer any better incentive delegation mechanism from a 
strategic incentive distortion perspective. 
Dierkes’ work is very helpful in determining the optimal contract within his 
framework. Additionally, his findings are stable for any sensible specification of 
the model parameters. Even though linear demand functions, as used in Dierkes’ 
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model, allow to yield straightforward comparative statics he refrains from 
discussing any such properties. Other authors have however shown that looking at 
comparative statics can provide interesting additional insight into the effects of 
certain parameter values. Specifically, Aggarwal and Samwick (1999) and Göx 
(1999) have shown that especially the degree of substitutability measured by the 
ratio f
e
 is important in determining the optimal contracts. The effects on the 
participation rates or the difference of transfer price minus real unit costs are not 
explored by Dierkes. For many reasons that have been discussed, Dierkes’ work is 
very valuable. Nevertheless, a consideration of comparative statics would have 
provided his paper with more profound completeness. For the interested reader the 
papers of Aggarwal and Samwick (1999) and Göx (1999) are indicated as 
appropriate complements to get deeper insights into this aspect, even though each 
paper only focuses on one of the two mechanisms. 
The conclusion of Dierkes’ paper is that given his framework it is optimal to 
stipulate an incentive contract based on relative performance evaluation with two 
positive participation rates s  (by assumption) and v  for the own and the rival 
firm performance. The observant reader might be surprised about the positive 
value of the latter. This might be on one hand due to the surprising contrast to the 
suggestions of classic principal-agent theory. On the other hand the reader might 
doubt the legality of paying a manager for the success of a competitor. This seems 
to violate anti-trust laws as it clearly encourages collusive behaviour. I have 
already discussed in this paper that Gilo (1996) and Aggarwal and Samwick 
(1999) have shown that this is actually not the case. Passive investments are 
generally allowed and anti-trust laws pose no restrictions on RPE-contracts. 
Nevertheless, omitting this discussion, as is the case in Diekes’ work, might cause 
the reader to be worried about the practicability of the suggested implications. 
Mentioning this could help ease any concerns a reader may have in this regard. 
There is another omission connected to illegality in Dierkes’ paper. Contrary to 
the previous anti-trust violation which an uninformed reader might have been led 
to assume, the following is indeed illegal. Recall, that the reference case in 
Dierkes’ model is represented by the standard Bertrand duopoly outcome. This is, 
however, only one possible reference solution. Another possibility would be the 
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cartel solution in which both firms engage in the most collusive behaviour.133 The 
first option is the reference case for most fierce competition with no cooperation. 
The latter is quite the opposite as basically a monopoly is formed and the benefits 
are shared among the two players. Naturally, this second option yields the highest 
possible profit for the firms but is clearly a violation of anti-trust laws. Hence, it 
hereby represents the upper limit of the possible outcome in terms of benefits for 
the firms and is thus a natural reference solution. Nevertheless, its missing 
practical relevance (due to the illegality) has probably lead Dierkes to refrain from 
the use of this benchmark. This is a valid choice as it helps to avoid additional 
confusion for the reader in the absence of a clear supplementary utility. 
Nonetheless, it would have been useful for the reader in terms of completeness to 
mention this upper limit and reveal the reasons for its exclusion. 
There is another aspect which could have been included in Dierkes’ paper to 
increase completeness. The article is clearly written from the perspective of the 
firm which makes perfect sense since its results are of normative nature and the 
decision makers are the principals of the firms (at least considering the main 
question of which incentive scheme is superior). In determining the conclusion 
that relative performance evaluation is the dominant mechanism within his 
framework Dierkes therefore uses firm profits as decision criteria. Contrary to 
Neus and Nippel (1996), Miller and Pazgal (2002) and especially Jansen et al. 
(2007) he does however not discuss any social welfare implications or 
redistribution effects. Again, in light of the main problem setting of his paper this 
decision appears natural. Nevertheless, there are at least two arguments suggesting 
that enriching the paper with a discussion of social welfare effects of incentive 
distorting mechanisms might have been beneficial. First, oligopoly theory is a 
concept originally derived within an economics and not a business framework. It 
would therefore appear to be appropriate to discuss also the economic effects of 
the model on social welfare. Second, not all the readers of Dierkes’ article are 
necessarily shareholders, firm owners or managers. Politicians and/or economists 
might well be interested in the effects beyond firm profits. In fact, adding the 
social welfare effects could include valuable information for policy makers. For 
example, the optimal contract in Dierkes’ model maximizes firm profits through 
the use of relative performance evaluation with a positive participation rate in 
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rival firm profits. This leads to a collusive-like behaviour among the competitors 
increasing their profits and presumably reducing total social welfare. Hence, by 
making the use of such a positive rival firm participation rate illegal with an 
addition to anti-trust laws competition among firms could be favoured and social 
welfare could be increased. The reader therefore should be aware that the article 
has a clear business perspective and does not fully cover all economic effects. 
Finally, the implications of the model discussed by Dierkes are all with regard to 
the design of the optimal contract given his specific environment. What he 
neglects to examine are more general implications for the theory of the firm, 
contrary to what Vickers (1985) did. The implications derived by Vickers are of 
general nature and apply generally to incentive distortion, independently of using 
strategic transfer prices or relative performance evaluation. In fact, they could be 
equally applied to the model of Dierkes. Maybe this is a reason why generally 
authors, not just Dierkes, have been neglecting to discuss these or further 
implications. Nevertheless, Dierkes could have explored additional propositions 
or at least reproduce Vickers arguments to give the reader a complete picture of 
the implications of strategic incentive distortion for the theory of the firm. 
 
4.3. Implications and practical relevance 
This subsection deals with implications for the practice combining the results of 
Dierkes and findings from the related literature. Additionally, some empirical 
evidence is discussed to emphasize the practical relevance. 
When covering the article of Vickers in section 3, I have already pointed out the 
four major implications for the theory of the firm for his model of strategic 
transfer pricing. The mechanism through which relative performance evaluation 
works is slightly different from the effects of STP, as was shown in figure 2 in 
section 2, but the effect is merely the same. Hence, the implications he derived are 
more generally applicable to the genuine case of strategic incentive distortion, 
independent of the specific mechanism on hand or the market environment. 
Therefore, profit maximization might extinct among managers (not owners) as it 
does not yield the highest profits. Splitting a company (or even only reorganizing 
into several divisions) might be beneficial while too much vertical integration 
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might be harmful. I refer to section 3 for a more detailed discussion of these 
implications. 
Besides these implications throughout the literature it has emerged that using 
relative performance evaluation is a dominant strategy of strategic delegation 
within most model environments. This holds true independent of the type of 
competition, Cournot or Bertrand, and of the type of products, strategic substitutes 
or complements. Nevertheless, the optimal contract of RPE might well look very 
different depending on the product-market environment. In fact, while in an 
environment of strategic complements the participation rate in the rival firm’s 
profit is positive, the opposite sign is optimal for a situation with products being 
strategic substitutes. To be able to achieve the desired effects companies need to 
know in which type of environment they are competing. This might not be as easy 
in practice as it may seem in theory. 
Furthermore, a positive participation rate in the rival firm’s profit induces 
collusive behaviour among firms. While I have mentioned in several occasions 
that Gilo has shown this to conform to existing anti-trust laws, this situation might 
well change if such a positive contract parameter value develops to become 
common practice. I will show at the end of this subsection that such a positive 
value is not convincingly supported by empirical evidence. If however this might 
develop into a kind of industry standard it would probably not surprise if the 
legislative authorities would step in to prohibit such behaviour in order to insure a 
competitive market environment. Before stipulating a contract with positive value 
of the participation rate in the rival firm’s profit, the owner should consider 
possible costs of renegotiation with the agent against the likelihood of such a 
scenario. Considering the other perspective, policy makers should give such 
prohibitive laws some serious thoughts in order to preventively ban behaviour that 
could damage social welfare. 
While legislative authorities have the possibility to interfere and prevent collusive 
behaviour among two or more firms, they do not have this option within the 
organizational structure of one single corporation. If the ideas of strategic 
incentive distortion are extended to the organizational design of one firm the 
results could imply a partial solution to the well known problem represented by 
the cannibalization effect. Similar to the reduction of competitive intensity among 
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firms, incentive systems could be used to alleviate competition among employees 
or divisions of the same corporation. Ziss (1999) goes even further suggesting the 
purposely creation of horizontal divisions within the firm are in order to create 
intra-firm competition. Assuming a Bertrand environment and appropriate 
incentive systems it might well have the effect of higher prices and higher profits 
for both divisions and consequently for the whole organization.134 However, these 
intra-firm effects have so far found only little consideration in the literature and 
possible effects on competitors outside the firm would need to be considered 
before deciding on changing the organizational design accordingly. 
It needs to be recalled that many implications discussed here apply to the case of 
simultaneous choice of contracts and prices based on some specific assumptions. 
The best reaction in a sequential game might well be different from the use of 
relative performance evaluation, especially for the follower. The literature has 
offered a few explanations when the result might be the Stackelberg outcome. 
First, Göx (1999) suggests that the characteristics and history of a market or sector 
might cause such a result and determine which firm will be leader and which will 
be follower. Second, Mujumbar and Pal (2007) show that the same situation is 
likely when dealing with a dynamic instead of a static environment. Third, 
Albuquerque (2009) obtains the same result for firms with considerably different 
cost structure (which could be due to different size and economies of scale). 
Hence, firms need to be aware that if these (or other not yet determined) 
conditions hold which make a Stackelberg outcome likely, the use of relative 
performance evaluation might not be the dominant strategy. 
Generally speaking, firm owners should never rush the incentive contract decision 
but very carefully value their product and market environment when deciding 
which incentive mechanism to use and how to shape the contract parameters. In 
doing so, they should however strongly consider the use of relative performance 
evaluation as a possibly very effective tool of strategic delegation in order to 
better pursue their goal of profit maximization. Note however that the models 
discussed in this work are generally not designed to provide an optimal solution 
for any specific practical problem. The magnitudes of parameter values are not to 
be taken at face value but should be interpreted as being a helpful indication of 
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possible consequences. The same is true for changes in assumptions or model 
specifications causing the parameters to change. Only the direction of change is 
interesting, less so the amount. This should be remembered when considering the 
actual implementation of a solution according to the results of the mentioned 
literature. 
 
This subsection is concluded by pointing out a few empirical studies to get an 
impression of the practical relevance of the topic. Note however upfront that this 
subsection does not pretend to give an extensive overview of empirical findings in 
the area but just discusses a few selected articles in order to give a general 
impression of the importance of the topic and the problems associated with the 
empirical study of it. 
First, the study of Gibbons and Murphy (1990) has already been mentioned in 
section 3. They find strong empirical support for the use of RPE in the classic 
benchmarking approach with negative participation rates in the rival firms’ 
profits. This would support a competitive environment of Cournot type. Also, in 
their study it appears that the agent is more likely to be evaluated relative to 
aggregate market movements than relative to industry movements. They argue 
that this appears plausible considering that many firms engage in several 
industries. However, as they define their studied industries quite broadly this is at 
least questionable. 
The empirical findings of Aggarwal and Samwick (1999) have also been 
discussed in more detail in section 3. Their results are quite different from those of 
Gibbons and Murphy. What is of most interest here is that they find statistically 
significant support for a positive participation rate in the profits of the peer group. 
Together with some other findings they derive empirical support for the 
differentiated Bertrand model. While Gibbons and Murphy focus on the risk-
sharing argument of the agency theory, Aggarwal and Samwick point out the 
conflict between strategic competition and the principal-agent problem. In this 
sense they provide an explanation for the restricted use of classic benchmarking in 
practice. 
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Aggarwal and Samwick looked at empirical evidence to be able to conclude 
which of their model environments, Bertrand or Cournot, is supported by the 
evidence. Kedia (2006) uses a different approach. She first tries to distinguish 
whether an industry is characterized by strategic complements or strategic 
substitutes and then checks if the empirical evidence supports the theory. Contrary 
to the previous two studies she opts for a model of profits and sales which, as was 
explained on several occasions in this paper, is equivalent to the use of strategic 
transfer pricing. The nature of competition is determined by estimating the slope 
of the reaction function.135 As the theory suggests, she finds that a transfer price 
smaller than marginal cost dominates in industries characterized by strategic 
substitutes. On the other hand, where competition is based on strategic 
complements she finds the transfer price to be above marginal cost.136 Moreover, 
Kedia identifies characteristics possibly determining the nature of competition in 
the industry. She finds that “industries with competition in prices among 
differentiated goods are more likely to compete in strategic complements.”137 
Competition in strategic substitutes on the other hand is more likely in “industries 
where firms compete in market share and where substantial investment is required 
in plant and equipment.”138 
The three studies discussed all somehow support the theoretical models but are far 
from consistent. Besides the obvious differences in timing and data of the studies 
this might have additional reasons. First, it is difficult to test for STP as data on 
internal transfer prices is normally not made public and therefore one has to rely 
on proxies. Second, when testing for RPE normally the implicit approach is used 
regressing executive pay on industry performance across a population of firms. 
This approach is hardly criticized by Gong, Li and Shin (2011). The method 
includes implicit assumptions about the peer group composition, the used 
performance metrics and the components covered by relative performance 
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evaluation which do not represent reality. The fact that the SEC passed new 
executive compensation disclosure rules in 2006 is used by the authors to test this. 
According to the new rules firms have to provide more details on the 
compensation of their executives including relative performance targets. When 
explicitly analyzing the contracts Gong, Li and Shin find that about 25% of the 
firms use some sort of RPE. However, this is not identified when using the 
implicit approach because of the above mentioned problems associated with it. 
Additionally, the study identifies that firms exposed to higher common risk or 
more competition are more likely to use relative performance evaluation. 
Especially the influence of competition intensity has been discussed in great 
length in the present work and is an important factor of the usefulness of strategic 
delegation. Fewer growth opportunities, less wealthy CEO’s, smaller sizes, 
independent boards and use of compensation consultants are other factors 
positively influencing the use of RPE. 
When discussing most models in this paper it has been argued that observability 
of the self-committing action is crucial for the strategic effect to be effective. 
Additionally, making the details of the distortive contract public has been 
identified as always being a dominant strategy. An interesting study connected 
with the observability of such details is provided by Park, Nelson and Huson 
(2001). In 1993 Canada introduced new disclosure rules on executive 
compensation which obliges firms to make the individual compensation of their 
executives public and not just the aggregate as previously required. The study 
compares pay levels and composition before and after the introduction of the new 
law. In the disclosure period general pay levels increase significantly, probably as 
a result of increased competition for managerial talent. More interestingly for our 
purposes, however, is that the magnitude of the participation rate has also been 
found to have increased. Despite the fact that this has mostly been achieved 
through market-based incentive pay139 and that the authors attribute this to 
shareholder and political pressure, what is interesting for our purposes is the 
general strong effect caused by the abrupt observability. It might, however, well 
be that part of the effects could be due to strategic considerations following the 
disclosure. More empirical research in this area is needed. 
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This selection of empirical studies shows that the topic is of high practical 
relevance. Empirics in this area are however difficult to conduct and models are 
not easy to be tested because much of the data needed is internal of the firms, 
especially when talking about transfer prices. This might also be the reason for the 
different conclusions drawn among the studies. The increasing diffusion of 
relative performance evaluation and the strong impact of executive compensation 
disclosure prove that firm owners are becoming increasingly aware of this topic 
and are adapting to its implications. More empirical research should shed further 
light on real world implementation of the discussed suggestions. 
 
4.4. Further research possibilities 
The article of Dierkes has a central role in this work and it has emerged from the 
literature overview that it fills an important gap in this research area. 
Nevertheless, there are several other aspects and options that could be subject to 
future research to get a more detailed insight into strategic delegation. A few of 
them are mentioned by Dierkes himself while others emerge when having a 
broader look at the literature. 
First, Dierkes’ main objective is to find out which of the two incentive schemes 
examined by him is better under the given assumptions. Nevertheless, he suggests 
that a combination of both approaches could also yield interesting results. The 
idea that a combination of two incentives can be better than each one on its own 
was already put forward by Ziss (1999). It is well possible that using strategic 
transfer prices and relative performance evaluation at the same time could further 
improve the outcome for the firms. This thought can be expanded to possibly 
include even more incentive distorting measures like the market share approach or 
others. With every additional criterion the degrees of freedom in manipulating the 
agents’ incentives increase and so could possibly the resulting payoffs. 
Nevertheless, there are at least two problems to such an approach. First, the 
literature on incentive systems suggests that the variable pay component should be 
as simple as possible. Otherwise the system becomes too complicated for the 
managers to understand and act accordingly. It will therefore be difficult to 
communicate to the staff and might not be accepted. Additionally, the information 
cost required would increase and might diminish the profitability of the whole 
 84 
system. The second problem is of more technical nature. If the number of decision 
variables is increased it is not possible with known mathematical methods to 
derive a Nash equilibrium on the first stage; neither analytically or numerically.140 
Therefore, there would be huge limitations in solving such a model. 
Another further research possibility indicated by Dierkes and more easily 
implemented is the incorporation of additional incentive distortion mechanisms. 
Even if the study of combinations of such approaches seems prohibitive there 
might still be other “pure” strategies worth considering. Jansen et al. (2009) have 
pursued this approach by studying a market share approach next to STP and RPE 
in an environment with Cournot competition. The logical next step would be to 
also extend Dierkes’ model of Bertrand competition by including this approach. 
Further, there might be other possible approaches that could be worth some 
theoretical consideration. There is in fact lots of room for creativity. 
Dierkes also points out that implementing a fully specified agency model with 
effort cost and risk aversion by the agent could yield interesting new results. We 
have seen this being actually the case in a few other papers in the literature like 
Fumas (1992) and Aggarwal and Samwick (1999). While these works have shown 
that the basic implications do not considerably change, this extension could 
nevertheless provide additional information. For example it might be possible to 
derive in more detail not only the optimal ratio of participation rates when using 
relative performance evaluation but also some indication of their optimal absolute 
level compared to the fixed part of compensation. 
Switching from a static to a dynamic model is another research extension 
proposed by Dierkes. Mujumdar and Pal (2007) show with their model that a 
dynamic model specification can lead to very different results compared to the 
static environment. Since in most real world application cases a dynamic model 
appears to be more reasonable it might prove very useful to extend Dierkes’ 
approach to such a dynamic context. The results would consequently have higher 
practical relevance and the expected outcome would be more realistic. 
Beyond these research possibilities listed by Dierkes there are others which can be 
deduced from the literature. One such option is to consider firms producing 
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 C.f. Dierkes (2004), p. 55. 
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multiple products. As with the switch from a static to a dynamic environment, 
switching to multiple product firms would make the model far more realistic. 
Fumas (1992) and Alles and Datar (1998) have pursued this approach in their 
respective model environments and gained interesting results as was discussed in 
section 3. Especially aspects connected to the possibility of cross-subsidizing 
products could be of great interest as it is commonly observed in practice. 
Another interesting enrichment of Dierkes’ model could consist of allowing cost 
differences among the firms. Quite a few papers discussed in section 3 include 
this difference in their respective models, namely Fershtman and Judd (1987), 
Neus and Nippel (1996), Miller and Pazgal (2002) and Albuquerque (2009). They 
all derive interesting conclusions as has been discussed in section 3. However, all 
of them consider only one distortion mechanism. Using this approach in a model 
similar to the one of Dierkes where two or more incentive schemes are compared 
will be much more complicated to implement. Nevertheless, if it can be achieved 
the results would be even more informative, again especially because the model 
would better resemble reality in most practical cases. 
Besides the possibility of having different cost structures among the firms another 
cost assumption could also be relaxed to improve the model. Dierkes and all other 
authors comparing different incentive schemes assume the implementation costs 
of these mechanisms to be equal. This is necessary to be truly able to compare 
different systems. Nevertheless it would be interesting to see how much better 
relative performance evaluation performs in Dierkes’ model compared to strategic 
transfer pricing. In other words, how much more could the implementation of 
RPE cost (in terms of administration, information costs, transaction costs and so 
forth) for it to overall yield the same result as STP? This could especially be 
useful for firms to judge the mechanisms in terms of costs and benefits before 
deciding on which incentive scheme to implement. 
In many articles mentioned in section 3 not only the highest possible profits for 
the firms are discussed but also social welfare effects are considered. This aspect 
is ignored by Dierkes. Analyzing the consequences for social welfare in his model 
would give a more complete picture of the model outcome. Also, it could add 
relevance to the article for readers outside the caste of entrepreneurs like 
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politicians and law makers or anti-trust regulation authorities. Further research 
should close this gap. 
When analyzing strategic delegation the standard approach is to use a game 
theoretic model. Dierkes followed this approach, too. Nevertheless, in section 3 
the article of Alles and Datar (1998) was discussed, which contrary to most other 
literature used a variant of the Hotelling model. In their model the objective of 
gaining market share is a powerful counter veiling incentive against raising prices 
in Bertrand competition. It is also very intuitive for many oligopolies in practice. 
It therefore proves to be an interesting addition to the existing literature. Further 
research could pursue this approach and apply such a model for example to firms 
applying not only transfer prices but perhaps relative performance evaluation or 
any other incentive mechanism. Furthermore, there might well be other model 
specifications, different from a game theoretic approach or a variant of the 
Hotelling model, that could yield interesting results for this area of study. 
Researchers might explore different settings to derive useful conclusions. 
Besides these interesting theoretical research expansions there is a lot of empirical 
work to be done, too. In the previous subsection it was shown through a few 
examples that empirical conclusions are still controversial. Research could study 
the nature of competition of certain industries and check whether firm owners and 
managers act in line with the predictions of the theory. Also, the magnitudes of 
the parameter values of the models could be tested. Moreover, an investigation to 
check whether relative performance evaluation dominates strategic transfer 
pricing not only in the model but also in the real world would be of great 
significance. Obviously the list could be carried on much further. Empirical 
research in this area is however quite difficult. The model implications are quite 
different depending on the nature of competition in the industry which is not easy 
to identify. The transfer prices used by firms are rarely published. The implicit 
approach often used in detecting relative performance evaluation is also 
problematic. Additionally, even though firm owners might realize RPE to be 
dominant over STP they might opt for the latter option in a Bertrand environment 
as it appears easier to communicate a transfer price above marginal cost compared 
to a positive participation rate in the competitor’s profit. All this together makes 
clear-cut conclusions very difficult. Puzzling as it is, that while the theory 
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suggests that making contract details public is always a dominant strategy it is 
very rarely observed in practice unless some disclosure regulation makes it 
obligatory. Future research could investigate how such publication could be 
possible and why it is not done more commonly. We see that lots of work is still 
to be done. 
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5. Conclusion 
 
The purpose of this work was to give an overview of the literature on strategic 
incentive distortion, particularly the ones focusing on the two dominant lines of 
study namely strategic transfer pricing and relative performance evaluation. 
Within this selection of articles especially a model used by Dierkes (2004) has 
been analyzed in detail. It was the first model to use both approaches within the 
same model, thus bringing the before separate research streams together. In fact 
he approaches the question which of the two distortion mechanisms achieves 
better results. This is why it has such a central role in this paper. The analysis is 
however followed by a critical discussion of the model using the findings, mainly 
theoretical but also empirical, of other authors. 
Generally, incentive distortion mechanisms are found to have beneficial effects 
for the firm applying them. Comparing them, Dierkes found that RPE is a 
dominant strategy over STP in his model. Looking at the related literature I found 
that most results do in fact point in the same direction. The dominant majority of 
models posing this question conclude that relative performance evaluation is the 
best choice in every thinkable situation. Nevertheless, the underlying assumptions 
heavily influence the design of the optimal contract parameters. Results and 
implications should not be taken for granted but be looked at with caution. For 
this purpose I have indicated what aspects should receive special consideration by 
the reader and how changes in the assumptions could alter the conclusions. This is 
particularly true for the type of assumed competition, Bertrand or Cournot, the 
assumption of complete information and the presence of uncertainties. 
Finally, I pointed out that a lot of research still has to be done in order to be able 
to make clearer propositions. Other incentive mechanisms or a combination of 
discussed ones might yield better results. Further, the models could be integrated 
in fully-specified agency models. Dynamic environments, multi-product firms and 
cost differences among firms are also only rarely considered. Above all though, a 
lot of empirical research to support or disprove the theories is needed. This shows 
that there are still a lot of interesting research questions in the field of strategic 
incentive distortion. 
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Additional calculus to subgame IV: 
Inserting prices into principals’ objective function: 
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Additional calculus to subgame V: 
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Additional calculus to subgame VI: 
Inserting prices into principals’ objective function: 
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Appendix 2 
 
Calculations to prove relations: 
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 Taken from Dierkes (2004), p. 56. 
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Since it was above shown that IIIIIIIIIIIII GGGGGG 212211 =>=>=  it also holds that 
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Appendix 3 
 
We provide the proof that the incentive scheme based on profit and sales or 
revenues is identical to the incentive scheme based on strategic transfer prices 
used in this paper. 
First, the objective function based on profits and sales used by Vickers (1985) for 
}2,1{, ∈ji  and ji ≠  is:145 
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This can be reformulated using simple algebra: 
( ) ( )jiiii ppxkpH ,⋅+−= θ  
As k  is fixed while iθ  is an arbitrary decision variable we can define: 
ii kt θ−≡  
It does, therefore, not make any difference if the explicit decision variable is iθ  or 
it . Using this last replacement results in the objective function: 
( ) ( )jiiii ppxtpH ,⋅−=  
This is exactly the objective function based strategic transfer prices used in this 
paper and hence the proof is completed. □ 
 
Second, the objective function based on profit and revenues used by 
Fershtman/Judd (1987) and Sklivas (1987) for }2,1{, ∈ji  and ji ≠  are basically 
equal and defined as:146 
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 To be exact the objective function is slightly different as Vickers based his model on Cournot 
competition. The adaptation here is done however without loss of generality. 
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 Again, a slight adaptation has been made without loss of generality. 
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Using simple algebra this can be reformulated: 
( ) ( )( ) ( )
( ) ( )jiiii
jiiiiii
ppxkpH
ppxpkpH
,
,1
⋅⋅−=
⇒⋅⋅−+−⋅=
γ
γγ
 
As k  is fixed while iγ  is an arbitrary decision variable we can define: 
kt ii ⋅≡ γ  
It does, therefore, not make any difference if the explicit decision variable is iγ  or 
it . Using this last replacement results in the objective function: 
( ) ( )jiiii ppxtpH ,⋅−=  
This is exactly the objective function based strategic transfer prices used in this 
paper and hence the proof is completed. □ 
It was shown that both incentives schemes, including either sales or revenues, can 
be rewritten to give the objective function based on strategic transfer prices. This 
implies that all three approaches are basically the same. Hence, it follows that it 
must also be possible to rewrite the combination of profits and revenues as a 
combination of profits and output volume. Since this has less relevance in this 
paper, I refer to Jansen et al. (2007) for this mathematical proof. 
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Abstract: English 
 
The separation of ownership and management in the large corporation presents the 
problem of goal alignment but also offers an opportunity. In an imperfectly 
competitive market this separation allows the owner of a firm to self-commit to a 
goal differently than profit maximization. Doing so becomes a strategic decision 
when it affects the behavior of competing firms. If the strategic effect of this 
decision outweighs the distorting effect then deviation from profit maximization is 
beneficial. 
Strategic transfer prices (STP) and relative performance evaluation (RPE) have 
both been acknowledged to provide the positive effects above mentioned when 
used as an incentive system in a duopoly setting. The question which of the two is 
better has been addressed by Dierkes (2004) with the conclusion that RPE 
dominates STP. Therefore, this paper thoroughly discusses and explains his 
model. However, the reader is given more insight through the discussion of 
related literature. This allows one to yield a more critical view of Dierkes’ work 
and to point out practical implications and omitted aspects. It appears that RPE is 
indeed a dominant strategy in most settings. Nonetheless, switching from a 
Bertrand to a Cournot environment, dropping the assumption of complete 
information or including additional uncertainties might significantly change the 
conclusions. 
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Abstract: Deutsch 
 
Die Trennung von Eigentum und Kontrolle in großen Unternehmen führt zum 
Problem die Zielkonsistenz sicherstellen zu müssen. Gleichzeitig ergeben sich 
dadurch aber auch Chancen. In Märkten, welche von unvollkommener 
Konkurrenz gekennzeichnet sind, erlaubt diese Trennung dem Eigentümer sich 
selbst an ein von der Gewinnmaximierung abweichendes Verhalten zu binden. 
Wenn sich das Verhalten der Konkurrenten dadurch beeinflussen lässt, handelt es 
sich um eine strategische Entscheidung. Ein positives Ergebnis wird erreicht, 
wenn der strategische Effekt dieser Entscheidung den Verzerrungseffekt der 
Abweichung vom Gewinnmaximierungsziel überwiegt. 
Es ist bekannt, dass die Verwendung sowohl von Strategischen Transferpreisen 
(STP) als auch von Relativer Performance Evaluation (RPE) als Anreizsysteme in 
Duopolmodellen zu solch positiven Effekten führt. Dierkes (2004) hat sich der 
Beantwortung der Frage angenommen, welcher dieser beiden Mechanismen zum 
besseren Ergebnis führt. Seine Schlussfolgerung ist, dass RPE über STP 
dominiert. Aufgrund der Wichtigkeit dieser Erkenntnis wird sein Modell in dieser 
Arbeit gründlich diskutiert und erklärt. Des Weiteren wird dem Leser durch die 
Diskussion themenspezifischer und weiterführender Literatur eine tiefere Einsicht 
in dieses Forschungsgebiet vermittelt. Dadurch wird dieser in die Lage versetzt, 
Dierkes‘ Arbeit kritisch zu betrachten und sowohl vernachlässigte Aspekte als 
auch praktische Implikationen zu erkennen. Dies führt zu dem Ergebnis, dass RPE 
für die meisten Annahmen tatsächlich die dominierende Strategie darstellt. Wird 
hingegen von der Annahme vollständiger Information Abstand genommen oder 
werden zusätzliche Unsicherheiten mit einbezogen, so können sich die 
Schlussfolgerungen signifikant verändern. Ebenso führt auch ein Wechsel von 
einem Bertrand zu einem Cournot Modell zu starken Veränderungen der 
Ergebnisse. 
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